容忍度和真实度
Tolerance and degrees of truth
摘要:
本文探讨了两种逻辑方法之间的关系:一方面是Smith(2008)辩护的模糊方法,另一方面是Cobreros,Egré,Ripley和van Rooij(2012)辩护的严格宽容方法。虽然前一种方法使用连续的许多值和后者隐含的四个,我们表明,这两种方法可以归入一个共同的三值框架。特别是,我们捍卫的要求,史密斯的连续许多价值观是不需要解决史密斯所谓的“颠簸问题”,我们表明,他们不需要他的帐户的逻辑后果。这三个价值不仅足以满足斯密的中心要求,而且还允许我们在对象语言中以容忍原则的形式内化斯密的封闭原则。减少,我们认为,事项的理由,多值性在一个适当的理论模糊语言。
英文摘要:
This paper explores the relations between two logical approaches to vagueness: on the one hand the fuzzy approach defended by Smith (2008), and on the other the strict-tolerant approach defended by Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij (2012). Although the former approach uses continuum many values and the latter implicitly four, we show that both approaches can be subsumed under a common three-valued framework. In particular, we defend the claim that Smith's continuum many values are not needed to solve what Smith calls `the jolt problem', and we show that they are not needed for his account of logical consequence either. Not only are three values enough to satisfy Smith's central desiderata, but they also allow us to internalize Smith's closeness principle in the form of a tolerance principle at the object-language. The reduction, we argue, matters for the justification of many-valuedness in an adequate theory of vague language.
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