隐私保护支付系统中小匿名集的危险性
The Danger of Small Anonymity Sets in Privacy-Preserving Payment Systems
摘要：
与其存在初期的建议不同，比特币和类似的加密货币实际上提供的隐私比传统银行少得多。这些加密货币的无数隐私增强扩展以及几种干净的隐私保护加密货币已经被提出。为了更好地理解流行的设计决策的保护，我们调查了预期的匿名集大小在最初的模拟研究。期望的交易值的大的变化产生清醒的小有效匿名集的协议，泄漏交易值。因此，我们研究了初步的，直观的策略合并成更大的匿名集的支付组的效果，例如通过选择预先指定的值类。结果是有希望的，因为它们确实以相对较低的成本诱导较大的匿名集，这取决于相应的策略
英文摘要：
Unlike suggested during their early years of existence, Bitcoin and similar cryptocurrencies in fact offer significantly less privacy as compared to traditional banking. A myriad of privacy-enhancing extensions to those cryptocurrencies as well as several clean-slate privacy-protecting cryptocurrencies have been proposed in turn. To convey a better understanding of the protection of popular design decisions, we investigate expected anonymity set sizes in an initial simulation study. The large variation of expected transaction values yields soberingly small effective anonymity sets for protocols that leak transaction values. We hence examine the effect of preliminary, intuitive strategies for merging groups of payments into larger anonymity sets, for instance by choosing from pre-specified value classes. The results hold promise, as they indeed induce larger anonymity sets at comparatively low cost, depending on the corresponding strategy
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