通过比特币交易分析去匿名化Tor隐藏服务用户
Deanonymizing Tor hidden service users through Bitcoin transactions analysis
摘要：
随着互联网上威胁的迅速增加，人们不断寻求隐私和匿名。比特币和Tor等服务被引入，为在线交易和Web浏览提供匿名性。由于其匿名模型，比特币缺乏追溯性的操作安全性，这意味着历史信息可以用来识别某个用户。我们研究了通过利用从在线社交网络、区块链和洋葱网站泄露的公共信息，对依赖比特币作为支付方式的Tor隐藏服务用户进行去匿名化的可行性。例如，这允许攻击者通过在区块链中找到至少一个涉及其公开声明的比特币地址的过去交易，将具有@alice Twitter地址的用户链接到具有private.onion地址的Tor隐藏服务。为了证明这种去匿名化攻击的可行性，我们进行了一个模拟被动的、有限的对手的真实实验。我们抓取了1.5K个隐藏服务，并收集了88个唯一的比特币地址。然后，我们抓取了5 B推文和1 M BitcoinTalk论坛页面，并分别收集了4.2K和41 K唯一的比特币地址。每个用户地址都与在线身份及其公共配置文件信息相关联。通过分析区块链中的交易，我们能够将125个独立用户与20个Tor隐藏服务联系起来，包括敏感服务，如海盗湾和丝绸之路。我们还详细分析了两个案例研究，以证明由此产生的信息泄漏对用户匿名性的影响。特别是，我们确认比特币地址应始终被视为可利用的，因为它们可以用于追溯用户的匿名化。这对于那些积极寻求并期望隐私和匿名的Tor隐藏服务用户来说尤其重要。
英文摘要：
With the rapid increase of threats on the Internet, people are continuously seeking privacy and anonymity. Services such as Bitcoin and Tor were introduced to provide anonymity for online transactions and Web browsing. Due to its pseudonymity model, Bitcoin lacks retroactive operational security, which means historical pieces of information could be used to identify a certain user. We investigate the feasibility of deanonymizing users of Tor hidden services who rely on Bitcoin as a payment method by exploiting public information leaked from online social networks, the Blockchain, and onion websites. This, for example, allows an adversary to link a user with @alice Twitter address to a Tor hidden service with private.onion address by finding at least one past transaction in the Blockchain that involves their publicly declared Bitcoin addresses. To demonstrate the feasibility of this deanonymization attack, we carried out a real-world experiment simulating a passive, limited adversary. We crawled 1.5K hidden services and collected 88 unique Bitcoin addresses. We then crawled 5B tweets and 1M BitcoinTalk forum pages and collected 4.2K and 41K unique Bitcoin addresses, respectively. Each user address was associated with an online identity along with its public profile information. By analyzing the transactions in the Blockchain, we were able to link 125 unique users to 20 Tor hidden services, including sensitive ones, such as The Pirate Bay and Silk Road. We also analyzed two case studies in detail to demonstrate the implications of the resulting information leakage on user anonymity. In particular, we confirm that Bitcoin addresses should always be considered exploitable, as they can be used to deanonymize users retroactively. This is especially important for Tor hidden service users who actively seek and expect privacy and anonymity.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
