arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2203.04993quant-ph
收藏

基于广义熵累积的量子密钥分发安全性

Security of quantum key distribution from generalised entropy accumulation

Tony Metger, Renato Renner

AI总结:

本文提出一个形式化框架,利用广义熵累积工具,将一般QKD协议对一般攻击的安全性证明归约为对集体攻击的安全性证明,并可直接处理准备-测量协议。

摘要:

量子密钥分发(QKD)的目标是在通过不安全量子信道连接的两方之间建立安全密钥。要在实践中使用QKD协议,必须证明有限长密钥对一般攻击是安全的:无论敌手的攻击如何,他们都无法获得关于密钥的有用信息。一个简单得多的任务是证明针对集体攻击的安全性,其中假设敌手在每一轮中的行为是相同且独立的。在这项工作中,我们为一般QKD协议提供了一个形式化框架,并表明对于任何可以在此框架中表达的协议,针对一般攻击的安全性可归约为针对集体攻击的安全性,而后者又可归约为数值计算。我们的证明依赖于一种称为广义熵累积的最近开发的信息论工具,并且可以直接处理通用的准备-测量协议,而无需切换到基于纠缠的版本。

英文摘要:

The goal of quantum key distribution (QKD) is to establish a secure key between two parties connected by an insecure quantum channel. To use a QKD protocol in practice, one has to prove that a finite size key is secure against general attacks: no matter the adversary's attack, they cannot gain useful information about the key. A much simpler task is to prove security against collective attacks, where the adversary is assumed to behave identically and independently in each round. In this work, we provide a formal framework for general QKD protocols and show that for any protocol that can be expressed in this framework, security against general attacks reduces to security against collective attacks, which in turn reduces to a numerical computation. Our proof relies on a recently developed information-theoretic tool called generalised entropy accumulation and can handle generic prepare-and-measure protocols directly without switching to an entanglement-based version.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑