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arXiv 2202.12173cs.GT
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自私行为对负载均衡博弈的影响

The Impact of Selfish Behavior in Load Balancing Games

Vittorio Bilò, Cosimo Vinci

摘要:

参与者的策略空间结构在多大程度上影响拥挤博弈中分散解的效率?在这项工作中,我们调查是否有更好的性能是可能的,当限制到负载均衡游戏中,玩家只能选择单一的资源。我们考虑三种不同的解决方案的概念,即,近似纯纳什均衡,近似一轮行走产生的自私的球员,旨在最大限度地减少他们的个人成本和近似一轮行走产生的合作球员,旨在最大限度地减少边际增加的球员的个人成本的总和。后两个概念可以解释为相关的资源选择问题的贪婪在线算法的解决方案。我们表明,在相当普遍的延迟功能的资源,更好的界限不能实现,如果球员是加权或不对称的。在积极的一面,我们证明,在温和的假设下的延迟函数,近似纯纳什均衡的性能的改善是可能的负载均衡游戏的加权和对称的球员在相同的资源的情况下。我们还设计了一轮步行在负载均衡游戏与未加权的球员和相同的资源的性能下限。

英文摘要:

To what extent does the structure of the players' strategy space influence the efficiency of decentralized solutions in congestion games? In this work, we investigate whether better performance are possible when restricting to load balancing games in which players can only choose among single resources. We consider three different solutions concepts, namely, approximate pure Nash equilibria, approximate one-round walks generated by selfish players aiming at minimizing their personal cost and approximate one-round walks generated by cooperative players aiming at minimizing the marginal increase in the sum of the players' personal costs. The last two concepts can be interpreted as solutions of greedy online algorithms for the related resource selection problem. We show that, under fairly general latency functions on the resources, better bounds cannot be achieved if players are either weighted or asymmetric. On the positive side, we prove that, under mild assumptions on the latency functions, improvements on the performance of approximate pure Nash equilibria are possible for load balancing games with weighted and symmetric players in the case of identical resources. We also design lower bounds on the performance of one-round walks in load balancing games with unweighted players and identical resources.

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