惯性局部多数规则可以解释网络协调博弈中的全局一致性动态
Local majority-with-inertia rule can explain global consensus dynamics in a network coordination game
摘要：
我们研究群体如何通过改变通信网络结构和个体激励达成共识。在342个由7个人组成的网络中，单个固执己见的“领导者”可以推动决策结果，但不能加速共识的形成，而相互冲突的意见会减缓共识的形成。虽然具有更多链接的网络更快地达成共识，但这种优势在冲突中消失。无主见的人做出的选择与当地多数规则相一致，加上“惯性”，有利于他们以前的选择，而固执己见的人喜欢他们的首选，但在高同行或时间压力下屈服。模拟表明，这些单独的规则可以解释组模式，并允许快速共识，同时防止死锁。
英文摘要：
We study how groups reach consensus by varying communication network structure and individual incentives. In 342 networks of seven individuals, single opinionated "leaders" can drive decision outcomes, but do not accelerate consensus formation, whereas conflicting opinions slow consensus. While networks with more links reach consensus faster, this advantage disappears under conflict. Unopinionated individuals make choices consistent with a local majority rule combined with "inertia" favouring their previous choice, while opinionated individuals favour their preferred option but yield under high peer or time pressure. Simulations show these individual rules can account for group patterns, and allow rapid consensus while preventing deadlocks.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
