最低工资与最优再分配
Minimum Wages and Optimal Redistribution
摘要：
本文分析了最低工资是否应该在税收和转移支付的基础上用于再分配。我的特点是最优再分配的政府与三个政策工具-劳动所得税和转移，企业所得税，最低工资-使用实证模型的劳动力市场与积极的企业利润。当最低工资提高低技能劳动力市场参与者的平均税后工资时，当企业利润影响很大时，最低工资可以增加社会福利。当与税收一起选择时，最低工资可以帮助政府有效地向低技能工人进行再分配，防止企业获得EITC等低工资收入补贴，并防止企业享受因未受影响行业的资本流动而无法通过公司税进行再分配的高利润。事件研究表明，过去20年来，美国州级最低工资改革提高了低技能劳动力市场参与者的平均税后工资，降低了受影响行业（即低技能劳动密集型服务业）的企业利润。充分的统计分析表明，美国的最低工资通常低于现行税收和转移支付制度下的最优水平。
英文摘要：
This paper analyzes whether a minimum wage should be used for redistribution on top of taxes and transfers. I characterize optimal redistribution for a government with three policy instruments -- labor income taxes and transfers, corporate income taxes, and a minimum wage -- using an empirically grounded model of the labor market with positive firm profits. A minimum wage can increase social welfare when it increases the average post-tax wages of low-skill labor market participants and when corporate profit incidence is large. When chosen together with taxes, the minimum wage can help the government redistribute efficiently to low-skill workers by preventing firms from capturing low-wage income subsidies such as the EITC and from enjoying high profits that cannot be redistributed via corporate taxes due to capital mobility in unaffected industries. Event studies show that the average US state-level minimum wage reform over the last two decades increased average post-tax wages of low-skilled labor market participants and reduced corporate profits in affected industries, namely low-skill labor-intensive services. A sufficient statistics analysis implies that US minimum wages typically remain below their optimum under the current tax and transfer system.
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