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arXiv 2201.09631cs.CR
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椭圆曲线认证芯片攻击的复杂性分析

On the Complexity of Attacking Elliptic Curve Based Authentication Chips

Ievgen Kabin, Zoya Dyka, Dan Klann, Jan Schaeffner, Peter Langendoerfer

摘要:

在本文中,我们讨论了困难的安装成功的攻击密码实现时,重要信息丢失。我们首先详细描述了我们对自己设计的攻击,以强调需要哪些信息来增加攻击的成功率,即我们将其用作针对商业加密芯片的后续攻击的蓝图。我们想强调的是,我们对自己设计的攻击与认证过程中发生的情况非常相似,例如根据通用标准,在这些情况下,制造商需要提供详细信息。在没有签署NDA的情况下攻击商业设计时,我们需要在互联网上密集搜索有关设计的信息。我们不能100%正确地揭示被攻击的商业认证芯片所使用的私钥。此外,缺少对所使用密钥的了解使我们无法评估攻击的成功。我们能够在认证过程中揭示处理序列的信息,甚至详细到识别处理各个密钥位的时钟周期。总而言之,这种攻击的努力远远高于攻击一个众所周知的实现。

英文摘要:

In this paper we discuss the difficulties of mounting successful attack against crypto implementations when essential information is missing. We start with a detailed description of our attack against our own design, to highlight which information is needed to increase the success of an attack, i.e. we use it as a blueprint to the following attack against commercially available crypto chips. We would like to stress that our attack against our own design is very similar to what happens during certification e.g. according to Common Criteria Standard as in those cases the manufacturer needs to provide detailed information. When attacking the commercial designs without signing NDAs, we needed to intensively search the Internet for information about the designs. We cannot to reveal the private keys used by the attacked commercial authentication chips 100% correctly. Moreover, the missing knowledge of the used keys does not allow us to evaluate the success of our attack. We were able to reveal information on the processing sequence during the authentication process even as detailed as identifying the clock cycles in which the individual key bits are processed. To summarize the effort of such an attack is significantly higher than the one of attacking a well-known implementation.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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