通过FPGA的远程随机重新配置来保护的仲裁器PUF
An arbiter PUF secured by remote random reconfigurations of an FPGA
摘要：
基于在现场可编程门阵列（FPGA）上实现强物理不可克隆功能（PUF）的新概念，提出了一种实用且高度安全的芯片认证方法。其定性的新颖功能是远程重新配置，其中PUF的延迟级被布置为FPGA的门的子集内的随机模式。在认证期间执行重新配置之前，PUF根本不存在。因此，即使攻击者之前控制了芯片，她也无法获得有关PUF的有用信息。该功能，以及严格放弃任何错误校正和挑战选择标准，这些标准取决于进入该领域的PUF的各个属性，使我们的强大PUF构造对文献中提出的所有机器学习攻击免疫。对我们的强PUF结构进行更复杂的攻击将是困难的，因为它们需要攻击者学习或直接测量整个FPGA的属性。一个全功能的参考实现安全的“芯片生物识别”。我们在25秒的时间内从1428个查找表中远程配置10个64级仲裁器PUF，然后在1毫秒内从每个PUF接收一个“指纹”。
英文摘要：
We present a practical and highly secure method for the authentication of chips based on a new concept for implementing strong Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) on field programmable gate arrays (FPGA). Its qualitatively novel feature is a remote reconfiguration in which the delay stages of the PUF are arranged to a random pattern within a subset of the FPGA's gates. Before the reconfiguration is performed during authentication the PUF simply does not exist. Hence even if an attacker has the chip under control previously she can gain no useful information about the PUF. This feature, together with a strict renunciation of any error correction and challenge selection criteria that depend on individual properties of the PUF that goes into the field make our strong PUF construction immune to all machine learning attacks presented in the literature. More sophisticated attacks on our strong-PUF construction will be difficult, because they require the attacker to learn or directly measure the properties of the complete FPGA. A fully functional reference implementation for a secure "chip biometrics" is presented. We remotely configure ten 64-stage arbiter PUFs out of 1428 lookup tables within a time of 25 seconds and then receive one "fingerprint" from each PUF within 1 msec.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
