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arXiv 2201.00061math.OC
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共享信息对网约车司机分配的价值:一项概念验证研究

The value of Shared Information for allocation of drivers in ride-hailing: a proof-of-concept study

Gianfranco Liberona, David Salas, Léonard von Niederhäusern

AI总结:

本研究通过Stackelberg博弈分析网约车公司向司机共享需求与分配信息的价值,提出共享信息的期望价值指标,并用简化模型与模拟验证,初步表明共享信息可能有益。

摘要:

对于网约车公司的司机而言,在城市内的分配对于获得匹配订单至关重要。这一决策取决于许多因素,其中一些因素(如需求和其他司机的分配情况)对司机而言是未知的,但公司却掌握这些信息。在本研究中,我们探讨网约车公司向司机共享这些信息是否有益。为此,我们通过Stackelberg博弈的视角研究该问题,并提出一个新的指标,称为共享信息的期望价值。我们提出了一个简化模型以进行概念验证研究:我们给出了由该模型推导出的双层规划问题的显式单层重构,并使用随机生成的数据进行了多次模拟。我们的初步结果表明,共享信息可能是有益的,值得进一步研究。

英文摘要:

For drivers in ride-hailing companies, allocation within the city is paramount to get matched with rides. This decision depends on many factors, where some of them (such as demand and allocation of others) are unknown for the drivers, but are available for the company. In this work, we investigate whether it is beneficial or not for the ride-hailing company to share this information with their drivers. To do so, we study the problem through the lens of Stackelberg games, and we propose a new indicator called the Expected Value of Shared Information. We present a simplified model to conduct a proof-of-concept study: we provide explicit single-level reformulations of the bilevel programming problems derived from the model, and perform several simulations with randomly generated data. Our preliminary results suggest that sharing information could be beneficial and deserves to be further studied.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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