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arXiv 2112.08153econ.TH
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税收与市场势力:主成分分析

Taxes and Market Power: A Principal Components Approach

Andrea Galeotti, Benjamin Golub, Sanjeev Goyal, Eduard Talamàs, Omer Tamuz

摘要:

差异化商品的供应商同时做出定价决策,这是战略上联系在一起的。由于市场势力的存在,这种均衡是无效率的。我们研究了政策制定者应该如何制定一个不平衡的税收和补贴政策来增加福利。一个关键的工具是货物空间的某种基础,由供应商之间的互动网络决定。它由特征束组成-正交的意义上说,任何特征束上的税收只通过它自己的价格-通过相关的特征值确定的系数。我们的基础允许一个简单的表征最佳干预措施。一个最大化消费者剩余的计划者应该对低传递的特征束征税,并对高传递的特征束进行补贴。系统的庇古杠杆--通过最优税收方案可实现的消费者剩余收益--仅取决于战略相互作用矩阵特征值的离散度。我们解释这些结果的网络结构的市场。

英文摘要:

Suppliers of differentiated goods make simultaneous pricing decisions, which are strategically linked. Because of market power, the equilibrium is inefficient. We study how a policymaker should target a budget-balanced tax-and-subsidy policy to increase welfare. A key tool is a certain basis for the goods space, determined by the network of interactions among suppliers. It consists of eigenbundles -- orthogonal in the sense that a tax on any eigenbundle passes through only to its own price -- with pass-through coefficients determined by associated eigenvalues. Our basis permits a simple characterization of optimal interventions. A planner maximizing consumer surplus should tax eigenbundles with low pass-through and subsidize ones with high pass-through. The Pigouvian leverage of the system -- the gain in consumer surplus achievable by an optimal tax scheme -- depends only on the dispersion of the eigenvalues of the matrix of strategic interactions. We interpret these results in terms of the network structure of the market.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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