有成本的多维甄别
Costly Multidimensional Screening
AI总结:
本文研究多维私人信息下的甄别问题,证明当代理人生产性与有成本维度偏好正相关时,仅甄别生产性维度的一维机制即为最优,该结论适用于一般空间,可应用于垄断定价、搭售与劳动力市场甄别等场景。
摘要:
若一种甄别工具会造成社会浪费,则它是有成本的,反之则是生产性的。委托人对拥有多维私人信息、且偏好为拟线性的代理人进行甄别,代理人的偏好可在两个维度上加法可分:一维生产性维度和多维有成本维度。委托人能否通过同时使用有成本的甄别工具,对简单的一维机制做出改进?我们证明,若代理人在两个维度上的偏好在恰当定义的意义下正相关,那么仅对生产性维度进行甄别就是最优的。该结果适用于一般类型空间与配置空间,允许非线性及相互依存的估值。我们讨论了其在垄断定价、搭售销售与劳动力市场甄别中的应用。
英文摘要:
A screening instrument is costly if it is socially wasteful and productive otherwise. A principal screens an agent with multidimensional private information and quasilinear preferences that are additively separable across two components: a one-dimensional productive component and a multidimensional costly component. Can the principal improve upon simple one-dimensional mechanisms by also using the costly instruments? We show that if the agent has preferences between the two components that are positively correlated in a suitably defined sense, then simply screening the productive component is optimal. The result holds for general type and allocation spaces, and allows for nonlinear and interdependent valuations. We discuss applications to monopoly pricing, bundling, and labor market screening.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。