使用通行费和损害赔偿进行筛选
Screening with tolls and damages
AI总结:
研究福利最大化设计者如何通过通行费和损害赔偿两种筛选工具分配商品,发现当两种商品估值异质时,损害赔偿可能优化机制,尤其在正相关估值下。
摘要:
一个福利最大化的设计者使用两种筛选工具分配两种商品:通行费,其成本与代理人的估值可分离;以及损害赔偿,对商品估值较高的代理人成本更高。通行费包括支付、排队和行政负担;损害赔偿包括质量降低、延迟和使用限制。当代理人仅在对一种商品的价值上存在差异时,设计者永远无法通过损害该商品获益。然而,当两种商品的估值都是异质时,使用损害赔偿可能是最优的,因为这两种工具可以以不同方式在可用选项中“分类”代理人。我提供了最优机制包括受损选项的条件,以及不包括它的充分条件;在后一种情况下,最优机制为每种商品设定“市场出清”通行费。直观地说,当两种商品的价值正相关时,损害赔偿更可能是最优的;而当一种商品的高价值预测另一种商品的低价值时,则不太可能最优。
英文摘要:
A welfare-maximizing designer allocates two kinds of goods using two screening instruments: tolls, whose costs are separable from agents' values, and damages, which are more costly to agents whose values for the goods are higher. Tolls include payments, queues, and administrative burdens; damages include quality reductions, delays, and restrictions on use. When agents differ only in their value for one kind of good, the designer can never gain from damaging it. However, when valuations for both kinds of goods are heterogeneous, damages can be useful. I provide conditions under which the optimal mechanism includes a damaged option, as well as conditions under which it does not; in the latter case, the optimal mechanism posts ``market-clearing'' tolls for each good. Intuitively, damages are more likely to be optimal when values for the two kinds of goods are positively affiliated, and less likely when high value for one good predicts low value for the other.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。