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arXiv 2111.09396eess.SYcs.SY
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通过输入滤波增强执行器攻击下的安全性

Enforcing Safety under Actuator Attacks through Input Filtering

Cédric Escudero, Carlos Murguia, Paolo Massioni, Eric Zamaï

摘要:

致动器注入攻击对所有通过通信网络控制的工业工厂构成了真正的威胁。在这篇手稿中,我们研究了限制控制器输出(即输入到执行器)的可能性,通过一个动态滤波器,旨在防止危险的植物状态的可达性-防止因此攻击诱导危险状态通过篡改控制信号。滤波器的合成是作为一个凸规划(凸成本与线性矩阵不等式约束)的解决方案,我们的目标是转移的控制信号的可达集,以避免危险的状态,同时尽可能少地改变控制器的动态。我们对原始控制信号和滤波信号之间的差异进行建模,并将其差异的H-无穷范数作为约束条件添加到合成问题中,通过有界实引理。通过仿真实验说明了结果。

英文摘要:

Actuator injection attacks pose real threats to all industrial plants controlled through communication networks. In this manuscript, we study the possibility of constraining the controller output (i.e. the input to the actuators) by means of a dynamic filter designed to prevent reachability of dangerous plant states - preventing thus attacks from inducing dangerous states by tampering with the control signals. The filter synthesis is posed as the solution of a convex program (convex cost with Linear Matrix Inequalities constraints) where we aim at shifting the reachable set of control signals to avoid dangerous states while changing the controller dynamics as little as possible. We model the difference between original control signals and filtered ones in terms of the H-infinity norm of their difference, and add this norm as a constraint to the synthesis problem via the bounded-real lemma. Results are illustrated through simulation experiments.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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