一个双边移动对策的分析研究
An Analytical Study of a Two-Sided Mobility Game
摘要：
在本文中，我们考虑了一个移动系统的旅行者和供应商，并提出了一个“移动性游戏”来研究当一个旅行者匹配到一个供应商。每个旅行者寻求使用仅一个提供商的服务旅行，该提供商管理一种特定的交通模式（例如，汽车、公共汽车、训练、自行车）。每个供应商的服务都有能力，可以在任何时刻为固定数量的旅行者提供服务。因此，我们的问题属于多对一分配问题的范畴，其目标是找到保证分配稳定性的条件。我们制定了一个线性规划，最大限度地提高旅客和供应商的社会福利，并显示它是如何等价于原来的问题，并将其解决方案稳定的分配。我们还调查了我们的结果下的信息不对称，并提供了一个“机制”，elastening的信息的旅行者和供应商。最后，我们通过一个数值模拟的例子来研究和验证我们的方法的优点。
英文摘要：
In this paper, we consider a mobility system of travelers and providers, and propose a "mobility game" to study when a traveler is matched to a provider. Each traveler seeks to travel using the services of only one provider, who manages one specific mode of transportation (e.g., car, bus, train, bike). The services of each provider are capacitated and can serve up to a fixed number of travelers at any instant of time. Thus, our problem falls under the category of many-to-one assignment problems, where the goal is to find the conditions that guarantee the stability of assignments. We formulate a linear program of maximizing the social welfare of travelers and providers and show how it is equivalent to the original problem and relate its solutions to stable assignments. We also investigate our results under informational asymmetry and provide a "mechanism" that elicits the information of travelers and providers. Finally, we investigate and validate the advantages of our method by providing a numerical simulation example.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
