流动性利益相关者互动关系的博弈分析
Game Theory to Study Interactions between Mobility Stakeholders
摘要:
城市化的不断发展和可持续发展目标的不断强化威胁着当前交通系统的运营效率,并使城市面临着对子孙后代产生巨大影响的复杂选择。与此同时,利用公共资源的私人、利润最大化的移动服务提供商(如叫车公司)的崛起,使当前的监管计划陷入困境。这就需要研究这些复杂的社会技术问题的工具。在本文中,我们提供了一个博弈论框架来研究移动生态系统的利益相关者之间的互动,建模监管方面,如税收和公共交通价格,以及移动服务提供商的运营问题,如定价策略,车队规模和车辆设计。我们的框架是模块化的,可以很容易地适应不同类型的移动服务提供商,市政当局的行动,以及移动系统中客户选择的低层次模型。通过对德国柏林市的分析和数值案例研究,我们展示了我们的框架计算问题的平衡,研究基本的权衡,并告知利益相关者和政策制定者干预措施的影响的能力。除其他外,我们显示客户满意度,环境影响和公共收入之间的权衡,以及战略决策对这些指标的影响。
英文摘要:
Increasing urbanization and exacerbation of sustainability goals threaten the operational efficiency of current transportation systems and confront cities with complex choices with huge impact on future generations. At the same time, the rise of private, profit-maximizing Mobility Service Providers leveraging public resources, such as ride-hailing companies, entangles current regulation schemes. This calls for tools to study such complex socio-technical problems. In this paper, we provide a game-theoretic framework to study interactions between stakeholders of the mobility ecosystem, modeling regulatory aspects such as taxes and public transport prices, as well as operational matters for Mobility Service Providers such as pricing strategy, fleet sizing, and vehicle design. Our framework is modular and can readily accommodate different types of Mobility Service Providers, actions of municipalities, and low-level models of customers choices in the mobility system. Through both an analytical and a numerical case study for the city of Berlin, Germany, we showcase the ability of our framework to compute equilibria of the problem, to study fundamental tradeoffs, and to inform stakeholders and policy makers on the effects of interventions. Among others, we show tradeoffs between customers satisfaction, environmental impact, and public revenue, as well as the impact of strategic decisions on these metrics.
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