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arXiv 2109.00923econ.GNcs.GTcs.LGq-fin.EC
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学术同行评审的拍卖与同伴预测

Auctions and Peer Prediction for Academic Peer Review

University of Washington(华盛顿大学)

Siddarth Srinivasan, Jamie Morgenstern

AI总结:

本研究采用机制设计方法,通过VCG拍卖分配评审名额并利用H-DIPP同伴预测机制激励审稿人,同时提升学术评审中的提交质量和评审质量。

摘要:

同行评审的出版物被认为是认证和传播研究社区认为有价值的想法的黄金标准。然而,我们指出了当前系统的两个主要缺陷:(1)由于提交量巨大,审稿人需求过载;(2)缺乏激励措施促使审稿人参与并付出必要努力提供高质量评审。在这项工作中,我们采用机制设计方法来提出对同行评审过程的改进,将论文提交和评审过程紧密结合起来,同时激励高质量提交和评审。在提交阶段,作者通过提交论文以及代表其期望论文被评审价值的出价,参与评审名额的VCG拍卖。在评审阶段,我们提出了一种新颖的同伴预测机制(H-DIPP),该机制基于信息抽取文献中的最新工作,激励参与评审的审稿人提供诚实且努力的评审。提交阶段拍卖产生的收入用于根据评审阶段中审稿人的评审质量向其支付报酬。

英文摘要:

Peer reviewed publications are considered the gold standard in certifying and disseminating ideas that a research community considers valuable. However, we identify two major drawbacks of the current system: (1) the overwhelming demand for reviewers due to a large volume of submissions, and (2) the lack of incentives for reviewers to participate and expend the necessary effort to provide high-quality reviews. In this work, we adopt a mechanism-design approach to propose improvements to the peer review process, tying together the paper submission and review processes and simultaneously incentivizing high-quality submissions and reviews. In the submission stage, authors participate in a VCG auction for review slots by submitting their papers along with a bid that represents their expected value for having their paper reviewed. For the reviewing stage, we propose a novel peer prediction mechanism (H-DIPP) building on recent work in the information elicitation literature, which incentivizes participating reviewers to provide honest and effortful reviews. The revenue raised in the submission stage auction is used to pay reviewers based on the quality of their reviews in the reviewing stage.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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