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arXiv 2107.08243math.PR
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具有连续与周期性行权机会的非零和最优停时博弈

Non-zero-sum optimal stopping game with continuous versus periodic exercise opportunities

José Luis Pérez, Neofytos Rodosthenous, Kazutoshi Yamazaki

AI总结:

该研究提出一种非对称行权机会的非零和最优停时博弈,在带正跳的Lévy过程下证明并构造了以尺度函数表示的纳什均衡,还通过数值示例分析策略行为与行权机会价值。

摘要:

我们提出了一种具有非对称行权机会的新型非零和最优停时博弈。给定一个模拟资产价值的随机过程,一名参与者可连续观测该过程并采取行动,而另一名参与者仅能在独立泊松到达时刻周期性地采取行动。率先停止的参与者将获得各自不同的奖励,另一参与者则一无所获。我们研究了每位参与者如何在收益最大化与抢先于对手停止的概率最大化之间取得平衡。在由带正跳的Lévy过程驱动的该设定下,我们不仅证明了纳什均衡的存在性,还显式构造了该纳什均衡,其博弈值以尺度函数表示。我们还提供了看跌期权收益下的数值示例,以研究参与者策略的行为,以及可用行权机会价值的量化。

英文摘要:

We introduce a new non-zero-sum game of optimal stopping with asymmetric exercise opportunities. Given a stochastic process modelling the value of an asset, one player observes and can act on the process continuously, while the other player can act on it only periodically at independent Poisson arrival times. The first one to stop receives a reward, different for each player, while the other one gets nothing. We study how each player balances the maximisation of gains against the maximisation of the likelihood of stopping before the opponent. In such a setup, driven by a Lévy process with positive jumps, we not only prove the existence, but also explicitly construct a Nash equilibrium with values of the game written in terms of the scale function. Numerical illustrations with put-option payoffs are also provided to study the behaviour of the players' strategies as well as the quantification of the value of available exercise opportunities.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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