集合覆盖对策中渐近有效性保证与瞬时有效性保证的平衡
Balancing Asymptotic and Transient Efficiency Guarantees in Set Covering Games
摘要：
博弈论的方法已经获得牵引力作为强大的方法来设计分布式本地算法，诱导所需的整体系统配置在多代理设置。然而，在这些方法中的重点是提供渐近保证代理网络的性能，并有一个缺口，在研究这些分布式算法的瞬态沿效率保证。因此，在本文中，我们研究的瞬态效率保证的自然博弈论算法的集合覆盖游戏类，已被用来模拟各种应用程序。我们的主要研究结果的特点，最大限度地保证效率沿瞬态的自然动态的最优效用设计。此外，我们刻画了帕累托最优前沿保证效率的过渡和渐近线下的一类博弈论设计。令人惊讶的是，我们发现，长期和短期的保证之间存在着一个极端的权衡，在一个渐近最优的博弈论设计可以执行任意坏的瞬态。
英文摘要：
Game theoretic approaches have gained traction as robust methodologies for designing distributed local algorithms that induce a desired overall system configuration in multi-agent settings. However, much of the emphasis in these approaches is on providing asymptotic guarantees on the performance of a network of agents, and there is a gap in the study of efficiency guarantees along transients of these distributed algorithms. Therefore, in this paper, we study the transient efficiency guarantees of a natural game-theoretic algorithm in the class of set covering games, which have been used to model a variety of applications. Our main results characterize the optimal utility design that maximizes the guaranteed efficiency along the transient of the natural dynamics. Furthermore, we characterize the Pareto-optimal frontier with regards to guaranteed efficiency in the transient and the asymptote under a class of game-theoretic designs. Surprisingly, we show that there exists an extreme trade-off between the long-term and short-term guarantees in that an asymptotically optimal game-theoretic design can perform arbitrarily bad in the transient.
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