Security of a storage device against a tampering adversary has been a well-studied topic in classical cryptography. Such models give black-box access to an adversary, and the aim is to protect the stored message or abort the protocol if there is any tampering.
In this work, we extend the scope of the theory of tamper detection codes against an adversary with quantum capabilities. We consider encoding and decoding schemes that are used to encode a $k$-qubit quantum message $\vert m\rangle$ to obtain an $n$-qubit quantum codeword $\vert {ψ_m} \rangle$. A quantum codeword $\vert {ψ_m} \rangle$ can be adversarially tampered via a unitary $U$ from some known tampering unitary family $\mathcal{U}_{\mathsf{Adv}}$ (acting on $\mathbb{C}^{2^n}$).
Firstly, we initiate the general study of \emph{quantum tamper detection codes}, which detect if there is any tampering caused by the action of a unitary operator. In case there was no tampering, we would like to output the original message. We show that quantum tamper detection codes exist for any family of unitary operators $\mathcal{U}_{\mathsf{Adv}}$, such that $\vert\mathcal{U}_{\mathsf{Adv}} \vert < 2^{2^{αn}}$ for some constant $α\in (0,1/6)$; provided that unitary operators are not too close to the identity operator. Quantum tamper detection codes that we construct can be considered to be quantum variants of \emph{classical tamper detection codes} studied by Jafargholi and Wichs~['15], which are also known to exist under similar restrictions.
Additionally, we show that when the message set $\mathcal{M}$ is classical, such a construction can be realized as a \emph{non-malleable code} against any $\mathcal{U}_{\mathsf{Adv}}$ of size up to $2^{2^{αn}}$.
PCBs are the core components for the devices ranging from the consumer electronics to military applications. Due to the accessibility of the PCBs, they are vulnerable to the attacks such as probing, eavesdropping, and reverse engineering. In this paper, a solution named EOP is proposed to migrate these threats. EOP encrypts the inter-chip communications with the stream cipher. The encryption and decryption are driven by the dedicated clock modules. These modules guarantee the stream cipher is correctly synchronized and free from tampering. Additionally, EOP also incorporates the PCB-level obfu…
Due to the widespread of advanced digital imaging devices, forgery of digital images became more serious attack patterns. In this attack scenario, the attacker tries to manipulate the digital image to conceal some meaningful information of the genuine image for malicious purposes. This leads to increase security interest about protecting images against integrity tampers. This paper proposes a novel technique for protecting colored images against forgery and pixel tamper. The proposed approach is designed as a hybrid model from three security techniques, Message Digest hashing algorithm (MD5), …
Since the inception of the Integrated Circuit (IC), the size of the transistors used to construct them has continually shrunk. While this advancement significantly improves computing capability, fabrication costs have skyrocketed. As a result, most IC designers must now outsource fabrication. Outsourcing, however, presents a security threat: comprehensive post-fabrication inspection is infeasible given the size of modern ICs, so it is nearly impossible to know if the foundry has altered the original design during fabrication (i.e., inserted a hardware Trojan). Defending against a foundry-side …
Non-malleable codes are randomized codes that protect coded messages against modification by functions in a tampering function class. These codes are motivated by providing tamper resilience in applications where a cryptographic secret is stored in a tamperable storage device and the protection goal is to ensure that the adversary cannot benefit from their tamperings with the device. In this paper we consider non-malleable codes for protection of secure communication against active physical layer adversaries. We define a class of functions that closely model tampering of communication by adver…
A whole range of attacks becomes possible when adversaries gain physical access to computing systems that process or contain sensitive data. Examples include side-channel analysis, bus probing, device cloning, or implanting hardware Trojans. Defending against these kinds of attacks is considered a challenging endeavor, requiring anti-tamper solutions to monitor the physical environment of the system. Current solutions range from simple switches, which detect if a case is opened, to meshes of conducting material that provide more fine-grained detection of integrity violations. However, these so…
TamperBench: Systematically Stress-Testing LLM Safety Under Fine-Tuning and Tampering
Critical ML Lab Waterloo Canada（Waterloo大学Critical ML实验室）；FAR.AI Berkeley USA（伯克利美国FAR.AI公司）；University of Toronto Toronto Canada（多伦多大学）；University of Waterloo Waterloo Canada（Waterloo大学）；ETH Zürich Zürich Switzerland（苏黎世联邦理工学院）；MIT CSAIL Cambridge USA（麻省理工学院CSAIL实验室）；University of Toronto, MPI, EuroSafeAI, Vector Institute Toronto Canada（多伦多大学、马克斯·普朗克研究所、EuroSafeAI、Vector Institute）；Critical ML Lab University of Waterloo Waterloo Canada（Waterloo大学Critical ML实验室）
Unauthorized data alteration has been a longstanding threat since the emergence of malware. System and application software can be reinstalled and hardware can be replaced, but user data is priceless in many cases. Especially in recent years, ransomware has become high-impact due to its direct monetization model. State-of-the-art defenses are mostly based on known signature or behavior analysis, and more importantly, require an uncompromised OS kernel. However, malware with the highest software privileges has shown its obvious existence. We propose to move from current detection/recovery based…
Blockchain transactions are signed by private keys. Secure key storage and tamper-proof computers are essential requirements for deploying a trusted infrastructure. In this paper, we identify some threats against blockchain wallets and propose a set of physical and logical countermeasures to thwart them. We present the crypto terminal device, operating with a removable secure element, built on open software and hardware architectures, capable of detecting a cloned device or corrupted software. These technologies are based on tamper-resistant computing (javacard), smart card anti-cloning, smart…
This paper proposes a novel method for tamper detection and recovery using semi-fragile data hiding, based on Lifting Wavelet Transform (LWT) and Feed-Forward Neural Network (FNN). In TRLF, first, the host image is decomposed up to one level using LWT, and the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) is applied to each 2*2 blocks of diagonal details. Next, a random binary sequence is embedded in each block as the watermark by correlating $DC$ coefficients. In authentication stage, first, the watermarked image geometry is reconstructed by using Speeded Up Robust Features (SURF) algorithm and extract wat…
We construct efficient, unconditional non-malleable codes that are secure against tampering functions computed by small-depth circuits. For constant-depth circuits of polynomial size (i.e. $\mathsf{AC^0}$ tampering functions), our codes have codeword length $n = k^{1+o(1)}$ for a $k$-bit message. This is an exponential improvement of the previous best construction due to Chattopadhyay and Li (STOC 2017), which had codeword length $2^{O(\sqrt{k})}$. Our construction remains efficient for circuit depths as large as $Θ(\log(n)/\log\log(n))$ (indeed, our codeword length remains $n\leq k^{1+ε})$, a…
App repackaging refers to the practice of customizing an existing mobile app and redistributing it in the wild to fool the final user into installing the repackaged app instead of the original one. In this way, an attacker can embed malicious payload into a legitimate app for different aims, such as access to premium features, redirect revenue, or access to user's private data. In the Android ecosystem, apps are available on public stores, and the only requirement for an app to execute properly is to be digitally signed. Due to this, the repackaging threat is widely spread. Anti-repackaging te…
Unitary $t$-designs are the bread and butter of quantum information theory and beyond. An important issue in practice is that of efficiently constructing good approximations of such unitary $t$-designs. Building on results by Aubrun (Comm. Math. Phys. 2009), we prove that sampling $d^t\mathrm{poly}(t,\log d, 1/ε)$ unitaries from an exact $t$-design provides with positive probability an $ε$-approximate $t$-design, if the error is measured in one-to-one norm distance of the corresponding $t$-twirling channels. As an application, we give a partially derandomized construction of a quantum encrypti…
Surveillance cameras, which is a form of Cyber Physical System, are deployed extensively to provide visual surveillance monitoring of activities of interest or anomalies. However, these cameras are at risks of physical security attacks against their physical attributes or configuration like tampering of their recording coverage, camera positions or recording configurations like focus and zoom factors. Such adversarial alteration of physical configuration could also be invoked through cyber security attacks against the camera's software vulnerabilities to administratively change the camera's ph…
