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arXiv 2104.11275cs.GT
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随机拍卖的随机通信复杂性

The Randomized Communication Complexity of Randomized Auctions

Aviad Rubinstein, Junyao Zhao

摘要:

本文研究了在$n$物品上具有组合估价函数的垄断卖方和单个买方之间激励相容拍卖协议的通信复杂性。由于收入最优拍卖是随机的[Tha04,MV10,BCKW10,Pav11,HR15](以及Babaioff,Gonczarowski和Nisan [BGN 17]的开放问题),我们专注于这个问题的随机通信复杂性(与大多数确定性通信的先前工作相反)。我们设计了简单的,激励兼容的,和收入最优的拍卖协议,其预期的通信复杂性是更有效的(事实上无限)比他们的确定性同行。我们还给出了几乎匹配的近似收益最优拍卖的预期通信复杂性的下界。这些结果遵循从一个简单的激励兼容的拍卖协议,使我们能够证明对随机拍卖协议的下界特征。特别是,我们的下界给出了激励与实施贝叶斯激励兼容的社会选择规则的通信复杂性之间的第一近似抵抗指数分离,解决了Fadel和Segal [FS 09]的开放问题。

英文摘要:

We study the communication complexity of incentive compatible auction-protocols between a monopolist seller and a single buyer with a combinatorial valuation function over $n$ items. Motivated by the fact that revenue-optimal auctions are randomized [Tha04,MV10,BCKW10,Pav11,HR15] (as well as by an open problem of Babaioff, Gonczarowski, and Nisan [BGN17]),we focus on the randomized communication complexity of this problem (in contrast to most prior work on deterministic communication). We design simple, incentive compatible, and revenue-optimal auction-protocols whose expected communication complexity is much (in fact infinitely) more efficient than their deterministic counterparts. We also give nearly matching lower bounds on the expected communication complexity of approximately-revenue-optimal auctions. These results follow from a simple characterization of incentive compatible auction-protocols that allows us to prove lower bounds against randomized auction-protocols. In particular, our lower bounds give the first approximation-resistant, exponential separation between communication complexity of incentivizing vs implementing a Bayesian incentive compatible social choice rule, settling an open question of Fadel and Segal [FS09].

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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