arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2104.11076cs.CRmath.CO
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具有完全保密性的分裂认证码:新结果,构造及其与代数操作检测码的联系

Splitting authentication codes with perfect secrecy: new results, constructions and connections with algebraic manipulation detection codes

Maura B. Paterson, Douglas R. Stinson

摘要:

分裂BIBD是一种组合设计,可以用来构造具有良好性质的分裂认证码。在本文中,我们表明,设计理论的方法是有用的分析更一般的分裂认证码。受代数操作检测(AMD)码研究的启发,定义了群生成分裂认证码的概念。我们证明了所有群生成的认证码都具有完全保密性,这使我们能够证明代数操作检测码可以被认为是具有完全保密性的认证码的特殊情况。我们还研究了可以“公平排序”的分裂BIBDs。这些分裂BIBDs产生具有分裂的认证码,也具有完美的保密性。我们表明,虽然组生成的BIBDs本质上是公平有序的,这个概念适用于更一般的分裂BIBDs。对于各种对$(k,c)$,我们确定的必要和充分(或几乎充分)条件存在的$(v, k \times c,1)$分裂BIBDs,可以公平地订购。我们可以解决这个问题的对是$(k,c) = (3,2), (4,2), (3,3)$和$(3,4)$,以及所有使用$k = 2$的情况。

英文摘要:

A splitting BIBD is a type of combinatorial design that can be used to construct splitting authentication codes with good properties. In this paper we show that a design-theoretic approach is useful in the analysis of more general splitting authentication codes. Motivated by the study of algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) codes, we define the concept of a group generated splitting authentication code. We show that all group-generated authentication codes have perfect secrecy, which allows us to demonstrate that algebraic manipulation detection codes can be considered to be a special case of an authentication code with perfect secrecy. We also investigate splitting BIBDs that can be "equitably ordered". These splitting BIBDs yield authentication codes with splitting that also have perfect secrecy. We show that, while group generated BIBDs are inherently equitably ordered, the concept is applicable to more general splitting BIBDs. For various pairs $(k,c)$, we determine necessary and sufficient (or almost sufficient) conditions for the existence of $(v, k \times c,1)$-splitting BIBDs that can be equitably ordered. The pairs for which we can solve this problem are $(k,c) = (3,2), (4,2), (3,3)$ and $(3,4)$, as well as all cases with $k = 2$.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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