基于时基密钥哈希函数和唯一消息标识的抗重放攻击消息认证方案
A replay-attack resistant message authentication scheme using time-based keying hash functions and unique message identifiers
摘要：
基于散列的消息认证码是一种非常简单但非常有效的构造，用于使用共享秘密来生成带密钥的消息认证。HMAC在许多因特网应用中作为特设数字签名得到广泛使用。虽然使用HMAC签名的消息可以防止发送者冒充和传输过程中的篡改，但如果单独使用，它们很容易受到重播攻击。我们提出了一个建设，扩展HMAC产生一个有键控的消息摘要，具有有限的有效期。然后，我们提出了一个消息签名方案，使用这个时间相关的MAC连同一个唯一的消息标识符来计算一组认证因素，使用它的接收者可以很容易地检测和忽略重放的消息，从而提供完美的抵抗重放攻击。我们进一步分析了基于时间的消息认证码，并表明它们提供了更强的安全保证比普通的HMAC，即使独立使用上述重放攻击的消息签名方案。
英文摘要：
Hash-based message authentication codes are an extremely simple yet hugely effective construction for producing keyed message digests using shared secrets. HMACs have seen widespread use as ad-hoc digital signatures in many Internet applications. While messages signed with an HMAC are secure against sender impersonation and tampering in transit, if used alone they are susceptible to replay attacks. We propose a construction that extends HMACs to produce a keyed message digest that has a finite validity period. We then propose a message signature scheme that uses this time-dependent MAC along with an unique message identifier to calculate a set of authentication factors using which a recipient can readily detect and ignore replayed messages, thus providing perfect resistance against replay attacks. We further analyse time-based message authentication codes and show that they provide stronger security guarantees than plain HMACs, even when used independently of the aforementioned replay attack resistant message signature scheme.
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