Detection of ultra-weak laser pulses by free-running single-photon detectors: modeling dead time and dark counts effects
Hristina Georgieva, Alice Meda, Sebastian M. F. Raupach, Helmuth Hofer, Marco Gramegna, Ivo Pietro Degiovanni, Marco Genovese, Marco Lopez, Stefan Kück
In quantum communication systems, the precise estimation of the detector's response to the incoming light is necessary to avoid security breaches. The typical working regime uses a free-running single-photon avalanche diode in combination with attenuated laser pulses at telecom wavelength for encoding information. We demonstrate the validity of an analytical model for this regime which considers the effects of dark counts and dead time on the measured count rate. For the purpose of gaining a better understanding of these effects, the photon detections were separated from the dark counts via a software-induced gating mechanism. The model was verified by experimental data for mean photon numbers covering three orders of magnitude as well as for laser repetition frequencies below and above the inverse dead time. Consequently, our model would be of interest for predicting the detector response not only in the field of quantum communications, but also in any other quantum physics experiment where high detection rates are needed.
Security of high speed quantum key distribution with finite detector dead time
分析了有限检测器死时间τ下高速量子密钥分发系统的安全性。当传输速率变得高于各个检测器的最大计数速率(1/τ)时,安全问题影响用于筛选比特的算法。分析计算和数值模拟的Bennett-Bullard BB84协议进行。我们研究罗杰斯等人。的协议(在“Detector dead-time effects and paralyzability in high-speed量子密钥分发,”New J.Phys.9(2007)319中介绍),其中存在具有执行拦截-重发攻击的能力的主动窃听者Eve。它表明,罗杰斯等人。的协议不再安全更具体地说,Eve可以在接收器端引起依赖于基底的检测效率。然后介绍了在存在死区时间和主动窃听者的情况下安全的修改的密钥筛选方案。我们分析和比较这些安全的筛选方案,这个活跃的Eve场景,并计算和模拟他们的密钥生成率。结果表明,被动基选择的最大密钥生成速率为1/(2τ),主动基选择的最大密钥生成速率为1/τ。有限检测器死时间的安全性分析也扩展到诱饵状态BB84协议。
Hamad Bin Khalifa University(哈马德·本·哈利法大学);Qatar Center for Quantum Computing, College of Science and Engineering, Hamad Bin Khalifa University(哈马德·本·哈利法大学科学与工程学院量子计算中心);STARTOVA UMK Sp. z o.o.(STARTOVA UMK有限责任公司)