流动民主何时能揭开真相?
When Can Liquid Democracy Unveil the Truth?
摘要:
在本文中,我们研究了Caragiannis和Micha [10]提出的所谓ODP问题。在这里,我们处于一个有两个选举选项的环境中,其中一个被认为是正确的。在ODP中,目标是组织社交网络中的委托,以最大限度地提高正确的替代方案(称为地面真理)被选中的概率。虽然这个问题是已知的计算困难,我们加强现有的硬度结果提供了一个新的强近似硬度结果:对于任何正常数$C$,我们证明,除非$P=NP$,没有多项式时间的ODP算法,实现了近似保证$α\ge (\ln n)^{-C}$,其中$n$是选民的数量。为这一结果设计的减少使用了连接不良的社交网络,其中一些选民遭受错误信息。有趣的是,在某些假设下,无论是选民的准确性或网络的连通性,我们得到了多项式时间的$1/2$ -近似算法。这一观察正式证明,社会网络的连通性是流动民主范式效率的关键特征。最后,我们运行了大量的模拟,并观察到简单的算法(以集中或分散的方式工作)在一大类实例上优于直接民主。总的来说,我们的贡献产生了新的见解,在这种情况下,流动民主可以是有益的。
英文摘要:
In this paper, we investigate the so-called ODP-problem that has been formulated by Caragiannis and Micha [10]. Here, we are in a setting with two election alternatives out of which one is assumed to be correct. In ODP, the goal is to organise the delegations in the social network in order to maximize the probability that the correct alternative, referred to as ground truth, is elected. While the problem is known to be computationally hard, we strengthen existing hardness results by providing a novel strong approximation hardness result: For any positive constant $C$, we prove that, unless $P=NP$, there is no polynomial-time algorithm for ODP that achieves an approximation guarantee of $α\ge (\ln n)^{-C}$, where $n$ is the number of voters. The reduction designed for this result uses poorly connected social networks in which some voters suffer from misinformation. Interestingly, under some hypothesis on either the accuracies of voters or the connectivity of the network, we obtain a polynomial-time $1/2$-approximation algorithm. This observation proves formally that the connectivity of the social network is a key feature for the efficiency of the liquid democracy paradigm. Lastly, we run extensive simulations and observe that simple algorithms (working either in a centralized or decentralized way) outperform direct democracy on a large class of instances. Overall, our contributions yield new insights on the question in which situations liquid democracy can be beneficial.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。