We consider a stochastic game between three types of players: an inside trader, noise traders and a market maker. In a similar fashion to Kyle's model, we assume that the insider first chooses the size of her market-order and then the market maker determines the price by observing the total order-flow resulting from the insider and the noise traders transactions. In addition to the classical framework, a revenue term is added to the market maker's performance function, which is proportional to the order flow and to the size of the bid-ask spread. We derive the maximizer for the insider's revenue function and prove sufficient conditions for an equilibrium in the game. Then, we use neural networks methods to verify that this equilibrium holds. We show that the equilibrium state in this model experience interesting phase transitions, as the weight of the revenue term in the market maker's performance function changes. Specifically, the asset price in equilibrium experience three different phases: a linear pricing rule without a spread, a pricing rule that includes a linear mid-price and a bid-ask spread, and a metastable state with a zero mid-price and a large spread.
We establish connections between optimal transport theory and the dynamic version of the Kyle model, including new characterizations of informed trading profits via conjugate duality and Monge-Kantorovich duality. We use these connections to extend the model to multiple assets, general distributions, and risk-averse market makers. With risk-averse market makers, liquidity is lower, assets exhibit short-term reversals, and risk premia depend on market maker inventories, which are mean reverting. We illustrate the model by showing that implied volatilities predict stock returns when there is inf…
Kyle (1985) builds a pioneering and influential model, in which an insider with long-lived private information submits an optimal order in each period given the market maker's pricing rule. An inconsistency exists to some extent in the sense that the ``constant pricing rule " actually assumes an adaptive expected price with pricing rule given before insider making the decision, and the ``market efficiency" condition, however, assumes a rational expected price and implies that the pricing rule can be influenced by insider's strategy. We loosen the ``constant pricing rule " assumption by taking …
The Kyle model describes how an equilibrium of order sizes and security prices naturally arises between a trader with insider information and the price providing market maker as they interact through a series of auctions. Ever since being introduced by Albert S. Kyle in 1985, the model has become important in the study of market microstructure models with asymmetric information. As it is well understood, it serves as an excellent opportunity to study how modern deep learning technology can be used to replicate and better understand equilibria that occur in certain market learning problems. We …
We reconsider the multivariate Kyle model in a risk-neutral setting with a single, perfectly informed rational insider and a rational competitive market maker, setting the price of n correlated securities. We prove the unicity of a symmetric, positive definite solution for the impact matrix and provide insights on its interpretation. We explore its implications from the perspective of empirical market microstructure, and argue that it provides a sensible inference procedure to cure some pathologies encountered in recent attempts to calibrate cross-impact matrices. As an illustration, we determ…
The continuous-time version of Kyle's (1985) model is studied, in which market makers are not fiduciaries. They have some market power which they utilize to set the price to their advantage, resulting in positive expected profits. This has several implications for the equilibrium, the most important being that by setting a modest fee conditional of the order flow, the market maker is able to obtain a profit of the order of magnitude, and even better than, a perfectly informed insider. Our model also indicates why speculative prices are more volatile than predicted by fundamentals.
This paper studies optimal market making for large-tick assets in the presence of latency. We consider a random walk model for the asset price, and formulate the market maker's optimization problem using Markov Decision Processes (MDP). We characterize the value of an order and show that it plays the role of one-period reward in the MDP model. Based on this characterization, we provide explicit criteria for assessing the profitability of market making when there is latency. Under our model, we show that a market maker can earn a positive expected profit if there are sufficient uninformed marke…
We introduce a modular framework for market making. It combines cost-function based automated market makers with bandit algorithms. We obtain worst-case profits guarantee's relative to the best in hindsight within a class of natural "overround" cost functions . This combination allow us to have distribution-free guarantees on the regret of profits while preserving the bounded worst-case losses and computational tractability over combinatorial spaces of the cost function based approach. We present simulation results to better understand the practical behaviour of market makers from the framewor…
Liquidity providers are essential for the function of decentralized exchanges to ensure liquidity takers can be guaranteed a counterparty for their trades. However, liquidity providers investing in liquidity pools face many risks, the most prominent of which is impermanent loss. Currently, analysis of this metric is difficult to conduct due to different market maker algorithms, fee structures and concentrated liquidity dynamics across the various exchanges. To this end, we provide a framework to generalize impermanent loss for multiple asset pools obeying any constant function market maker wit…
We analyse two models of liquidity provision to determine the retail traders' preference for marketable order routing. Order internalization is captured by a model of market makers competing for the retail order flow in a Bertrand fashion. On the other hand, the price-taking competitive liquidity providers characterize the open exchange model. We show that, when liquidity providers are risk averse, routing of the marketable orders to the wholesalers is preferred by all retail traders: informed, uninformed and noisy. The unwillingness of liquidity providers to bear risk causes the strategic tra…
Constant-product market making functions were first introduced by Hayden Adams in 2017 to create Uniswap, a decentralised exchange on Ethereum. This enables users to exchange assets at any given rate. Some variations such as Balancer and Curve were later introduced. In this paper, we analyse the maths that rule this type of protocol. We show that splitting a trade in multiple smaller trades does not impact the final exchange rate. We also show that the protocol is safer and more profitable when no one recompounds their fees.
This paper studies the Glosten Milgrom model whose risky asset value admits an arbitrary discrete distribution. Contrast to existing results on insider's models, the insider's optimal strategy in this model, if exists, is not of feedback type. Therefore a weak formulation of equilibrium is proposed. In this weak formulation, the inconspicuous trade theorem still holds, but the optimality for the insider's strategy is not enforced. However, the insider can employ some feedback strategy whose associated expected profit is close to the optimal value, when the order size is small. Moreover this di…
In this paper, we present a multi-period trading model in the style of Kyle (1985)'s inside trading model, by assuming that there are at least two insiders in the market with long-lived private information, under the requirement that each insider publicly discloses his stock trades after the fact. Based on this model, we study the influences of "public disclosure" and "competition among insiders" on the trading behaviors of insiders. We find that the "competition among insiders" leads to higher effective price and lower insiders' profits, and the "public disclosure" makes each insider play a m…
We model an informed agent with information about the future value of an asset trying to maximize profits when subjected to a transaction cost as well as a market maker tasked with setting fair transaction prices. In a single auction model, equilibrium is characterized by the unique root of a particular polynomial. Analysis of this polynomial with small levels of risk-aversion and transaction costs reveal a dimensionless parameter which captures several orders of asymptotic accuracy of the equilibrium behaviour. In a continuous time analogue of the single auction model, incorporation of a tran…
When prices reflect all available information, they oscillate around an equilibrium level. This oscillation is the result of the temporary market impact caused by waves of buyers and sellers. This price behavior can be approximated through an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (O-U) process. Market makers provide liquidity in an attempt to monetize this oscillation. They enter a long position when a security is priced below its estimated equilibrium level, and they enter a short position when a security is priced above its estimated equilibrium level. They hold that position until one of three outcomes occur:…
We show that adversarial reinforcement learning (ARL) can be used to produce market marking agents that are robust to adversarial and adaptively-chosen market conditions. To apply ARL, we turn the well-studied single-agent model of Avellaneda and Stoikov [2008] into a discrete-time zero-sum game between a market maker and adversary. The adversary acts as a proxy for other market participants that would like to profit at the market maker's expense. We empirically compare two conventional single-agent RL agents with ARL, and show that our ARL approach leads to: 1) the emergence of risk-averse be…
In light of micro-scale inefficiencies induced by the high degree of fragmentation of the Bitcoin trading landscape, we utilize a granular data set comprised of orderbook and trades data from the most liquid Bitcoin markets, in order to understand the price formation process at sub-1 second time scales. To achieve this goal, we construct a set of features that encapsulate relevant microstructural information over short lookback windows. These features are subsequently leveraged first to generate a leader-lagger network that quantifies how markets impact one another, and then to train linear mo…
IMM: An Imitative Reinforcement Learning Approach with Predictive Representation Learning for Automatic Market Making
Tsinghua University（清华大学）；International Digital Economy Academy（国际数字经济研究院）；Harbin Institute of Technology（哈尔滨工业大学）；Nanyang Technological University（南洋理工大学）
The Invisible Handshake: Persistent Overpricing by Adaptive Market Agents
Department of Computer Science University of Milan（米兰大学计算机科学系）；Institute of Finance University of Lugano（卢加诺大学金融研究所）；LLUI；Department of Computer Science Vienna University of Technology（技术大学维也纳计算机科学系）
