arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2003.01820q-fin.TRcs.AIcs.LGstat.ML
收藏

基于对抗性强化学习的鲁棒做市策略

Robust Market Making via Adversarial Reinforcement Learning

University of Liverpool(利物浦大学)

Thomas Spooner, Rahul Savani

摘要:

我们证明了对抗强化学习(ARL)可以用来产生对对抗和自适应选择的市场条件具有鲁棒性的市场标记代理。为了应用ARL,我们将Avellaneda和Stoikov [2008]的单代理模型转化为做市商和对手之间的离散时间零和博弈。对手充当了其他市场参与者的代理人,这些参与者希望以做市商为代价获利。我们实证比较了两个传统的单代理RL代理与ARL,并表明我们的ARL方法导致:1)出现风险规避行为,没有约束或特定领域的惩罚; 2)在一组标准指标的性能显着改善,在测试环境中评估有或没有对手,以及; 3)提高鲁棒性模型的不确定性。我们的经验表明,我们的ARL方法一致收敛,我们证明了几种特殊情况下,我们收敛到一个简化的单阶段游戏中的纳什均衡的配置文件。

英文摘要:

We show that adversarial reinforcement learning (ARL) can be used to produce market marking agents that are robust to adversarial and adaptively-chosen market conditions. To apply ARL, we turn the well-studied single-agent model of Avellaneda and Stoikov [2008] into a discrete-time zero-sum game between a market maker and adversary. The adversary acts as a proxy for other market participants that would like to profit at the market maker's expense. We empirically compare two conventional single-agent RL agents with ARL, and show that our ARL approach leads to: 1) the emergence of risk-averse behaviour without constraints or domain-specific penalties; 2) significant improvements in performance across a set of standard metrics, evaluated with or without an adversary in the test environment, and; 3) improved robustness to model uncertainty. We empirically demonstrate that our ARL method consistently converges, and we prove for several special cases that the profiles that we converge to correspond to Nash equilibria in a simplified single-stage game.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑