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arXiv 2102.13457cs.GTcs.DC
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基于分布式计算理论的图形博弈纳什均衡收敛复杂性分类

Classifying Convergence Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Graphical Games Using Distributed Computing Theory

Juho Hirvonen, Laura Schmid, Krishnendu Chatterjee, Stefan Schmid

摘要:

图形游戏是一个有用的框架,用于建模(自私)代理的交互,这些代理通过底层拓扑连接,并且其行为相互影响。它们有着广泛的应用,从计算机科学到经济学和生物学。然而,即使一个玩家的收益只取决于他们的直接邻居在图形游戏中的行动,计算纳什均衡,并作出声明的收敛时间的“自然”的局部动态,特别是可以是极具挑战性的。在这项工作中,我们提出了一种新的方法,通过建立连接到本地图算法,分布式计算的一个子领域的图形游戏中的纳什均衡的复杂性进行分类。特别是,我们观察到的图形游戏的均衡是等价于本地可验证的标签(LVL)在图中,顶点标签是可验证的恒定轮本地算法。这种连接使我们能够推导出新的下界收敛时间的最佳反应动态图形游戏中的平衡。由于我们建立了分布式收敛有时可以证明是缓慢的,我们还介绍了一个直观的概念,“时间约束”的最佳对策的低效率,并给出了界限。我们讨论了如何使用我们的结果,以确保收敛的最佳对策的纳什均衡的机制的实施。因此,我们的研究结果也给洞察的收敛性的策略证明算法的图形游戏,这仍然是不太清楚。

英文摘要:

Graphical games are a useful framework for modeling the interactions of (selfish) agents who are connected via an underlying topology and whose behaviors influence each other. They have wide applications ranging from computer science to economics and biology. Yet, even though a player's payoff only depends on the actions of their direct neighbors in graphical games, computing the Nash equilibria and making statements about the convergence time of "natural" local dynamics in particular can be highly challenging. In this work, we present a novel approach for classifying complexity of Nash equilibria in graphical games by establishing a connection to local graph algorithms, a subfield of distributed computing. In particular, we make the observation that the equilibria of graphical games are equivalent to locally verifiable labelings (LVL) in graphs; vertex labelings which are verifiable with a constant-round local algorithm. This connection allows us to derive novel lower bounds on the convergence time to equilibrium of best-response dynamics in graphical games. Since we establish that distributed convergence can sometimes be provably slow, we also introduce and give bounds on an intuitive notion of "time-constrained" inefficiency of best responses. We exemplify how our results can be used in the implementation of mechanisms that ensure convergence of best responses to a Nash equilibrium. Our results thus also give insight into the convergence of strategy-proof algorithms for graphical games, which is still not well understood.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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