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arXiv 2102.12811econ.GNq-fin.EC
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权衡匹配:相对于竞争特征的显示偏好

Matching with Trade-offs: Revealed Preferences over Competing Characteristics

Alfred Galichon, Bernard Salanié

摘要:

本文研究了具有竞争准则的最优匹配问题的理论和计量经济学。例如,婚姻配对的盈余可能既取决于伴侣的收入和教育程度,也取决于分析师没有观察到的特征。即使盈余在收入上是互补的,在教育上是互补的,但在个人层面上,收入和教育之间的不完全相关意味着社会最优必须在收入匹配和教育匹配之间进行权衡。给定一个灵活的规范的盈余函数,我们刻画在温和的假设下的属性的一组可行的匹配和社会最佳匹配。然后,我们展示了如何在所观察到的匹配的合作伙伴的类型的协变数据可以用来测试,所观察到的匹配是社会最优的本规范,并估计的参数,定义社会偏好的匹配。

英文摘要:

We investigate in this paper the theory and econometrics of optimal matchings with competing criteria. The surplus from a marriage match, for instance, may depend both on the incomes and on the educations of the partners, as well as on characteristics that the analyst does not observe. Even if the surplus is complementary in incomes, and complementary in educations, imperfect correlation between income and education at the individual level implies that the social optimum must trade off matching on incomes and matching on educations. Given a flexible specification of the surplus function, we characterize under mild assumptions the properties of the set of feasible matchings and of the socially optimal matching. Then we show how data on the covariation of the types of the partners in observed matches can be used to test that the observed matches are socially optimal for this specification, and to estimate the parameters that define social preferences over matches.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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