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arXiv 2102.07147econ.GNq-fin.EC
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自动驾驶汽车众包市场的聚合模型与均衡分析

Aggregate Modeling and Equilibrium Analysis of the Crowdsourcing Market for Autonomous Vehicles

Xiaoyan Wang, Xi Lin, Meng Li

摘要:

自动驾驶汽车(AV)具有在各个方面重塑人类移动性的潜力。本文重点介绍了一种新的可能性,即自动驾驶汽车所有者可以选择将他们的自动驾驶汽车“出租”给一家公司,该公司可以使用这些收集的自动驾驶汽车提供按需乘车服务,而无需任何司机。我们将这种具有AV租赁选项的移动市场称为“AV众包市场”。本文建立了一个包含多种交通方式的总量均衡模型来分析AV众包市场。该模型框架可以捕捉到存在交通拥堵时客户的模式选择和AV所有者的租赁决策。然后,我们探讨不同的情况下,要么最大化众包平台的利润或最大化社会福利。基于遗传算法的优化算法被设计用于解决这些问题。通过数值算例得到的结果表明,福利的增强和强大的盈利能力的AV众包服务。然而,当众包规模较小时,众包平台可能无法盈利。次优定价方案能够避免这种不良情况。从分析中产生的见解为监管机构、服务提供商和公民提供了指导,以便在未来做出关于利用AV众包市场为社会服务的决策。

英文摘要:

Autonomous vehicles (AVs) have the potential of reshaping the human mobility in a wide variety of aspects. This paper focuses on a new possibility that the AV owners have the option of "renting" their AVs to a company, which can use these collected AVs to provide on-demand ride services without any drivers. We call such a mobility market with AV renting options the "AV crowdsourcing market". This paper establishes an aggregate equilibrium model with multiple transport modes to analyze the AV crowdsourcing market. The modeling framework can capture the customers' mode choices and AV owners' rental decisions with the presence of traffic congestion. Then, we explore different scenarios that either maximize the crowdsourcing platform's profit or maximize social welfare. Gradient-based optimization algorithms are designed for solving the problems. The results obtained by numerical examples reveal the welfare enhancement and the strong profitability of the AV crowdsourcing service. However, when the crowdsourcing scale is small, the crowdsourcing platform might not be profitable. A second-best pricing scheme is able to avoid such undesirable cases. The insights generated from the analyses provide guidance for regulators, service providers and citizens to make future decisions regarding the utilization of the AV crowdsourcing markets for serving the good of the society.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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