微观加总利润份额
The Micro-Aggregated Profit Share
AI总结:
利用美国Compustat微观数据,研究发现1970至2020年市场势力上升,但利润份额稳定在GDP的18%,因垄断租金被固定成本和技术变化抵消,并警示过度反垄断执法可能降低竞争。
摘要:
在过去五十年里,美国的市场势力增加了多少?市场势力的上升又如何影响加总利润?利用美国Compustat的微观层面数据,我们发现自1970年以来,市场势力的若干指标持续上升。特别是,加总加成率从1970年价格超出边际成本的10%上升至2020年的23%,加总规模报酬从1.00上升至1.13。我们将这些市场势力指标与盈利能力联系起来,证明加总利润份额可以用加总加成率、加总规模报酬以及一个捕捉经济中双重边际化的生产网络的充分统计量来表示。我们发现,尽管市场势力上升,利润份额一直稳定在GDP的18%,因为垄断租金的增加被固定成本上升和技术变化完全抵消。我们的实证结果对政策制定者具有微妙含义:过度激进的的反垄断执法可能降低企业活力,并矛盾地导致竞争减少和市场势力增强。
英文摘要:
How much has market power increased in the United States in the last fifty years? And how did the rise in market power affect aggregate profits? Using micro-level data from U.S. Compustat, we find that several indicators of market power have steadily increased since 1970. In particular, the aggregate markup has gone up from 10% of price over marginal cost in 1970 to 23% in 2020, and aggregate returns to scale have risen from 1.00 to 1.13. We connect these market-power indicators to profitability by showing that the aggregate profit share can be expressed in terms of the aggregate markup, aggregate returns to scale, and a sufficient statistic for production networks that captures double marginalization in the economy. We find that despite the rise in market power, the profit share has been constant at 18% of GDP because the increase in monopoly rents has been completely offset by rising fixed costs and changes in technology. Our empirical results have subtle implications for policymakers: overly aggressive enforcement of antitrust law could decrease firm dynamism and paradoxically lead to lower competition and higher market power.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。