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arXiv 2102.04209cs.CYcs.AIcs.HC
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Guilty Artificial Minds

University of Tübingen, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker Center(图宾根大学,卡尔·弗里德里希·冯·魏茨泽克中心);University of Geneva, Department of Philosophy(日内瓦大学哲学系);University of Zurich, Department of Philosophy(苏黎世大学哲学系)

Michael T. Stuart, Markus Kneer

英文摘要:

The concepts of blameworthiness and wrongness are of fundamental importance in human moral life. But to what extent are humans disposed to blame artificially intelligent agents, and to what extent will they judge their actions to be morally wrong? To make progress on these questions, we adopted two novel strategies. First, we break down attributions of blame and wrongness into more basic judgments about the epistemic and conative state of the agent, and the consequences of the agent's actions. In this way, we are able to examine any differences between the way participants treat artificial agents in terms of differences in these more basic judgments. our second strategy is to compare attributions of blame and wrongness across human, artificial, and group agents (corporations). Others have compared attributions of blame and wrongness between human and artificial agents, but the addition of group agents is significant because these agents seem to provide a clear middle-ground between human agents (for whom the notions of blame and wrongness were created) and artificial agents (for whom the question remains open).

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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