This work seeks to study the beneficial properties that an autonomous agent can obtain by implementing a cognitive architecture similar to the one of conscious beings. Along this document, a conscious model of autonomous agent based in a global workspace architecture is presented. We describe how this agent is viewed from different perspectives of philosophy of mind, being inspired by their ideas. The goal of this model is to create autonomous agents able to navigate within an environment composed of multiple independent magnitudes, adapting to its surroundings in order to find the best possible position in base of its inner preferences. The purpose of the model is to test the effectiveness of many cognitive mechanisms that are incorporated, such as an attention mechanism for magnitude selection, pos-session of inner feelings and preferences, usage of a memory system to storage beliefs and past experiences, and incorporating a global workspace which controls and integrates information processed by all the subsystem of the model. We show in a large experiment set how an autonomous agent can benefit from having a cognitive architecture such as the one described.
The Phenomenology of Machine: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Sentience of the OpenAI-o1 Model Integrating Functionalism, Consciousness Theories, Active Inference, and AI Architectures
The rise of deep learning has brought artificial intelligence (AI) to the forefront. The ultimate goal of AI is to realize machines with human mind and consciousness, but existing achievements mainly simulate intelligent behavior on computer platforms. These achievements all belong to weak AI rather than strong AI. How to achieve strong AI is not known yet in the field of intelligence science. Currently, this field is calling for a new paradigm, especially Theory of Cognitive Relativity (TCR). The TCR aims to summarize a simple and elegant set of first principles about the nature of intelligen…
This paper aims at demonstrating how a first-order logic reasoning system in combination with a large knowledge base can be understood as an artificial consciousness system. For this we review some aspects from the area of philosophy of mind and in particular Tononi's Information Integration Theory (IIT) and Baars' Global Workspace Theory. These will be applied to the reasoning system Hyper with ConceptNet as a knowledge base within a scenario of commonsense and cognitive reasoning. Finally we demonstrate that such a system is very well able to do conscious mind wandering.
Computational complexity has often been ignored in philosophy of mind, in philosophical artificial intelligence studies. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First and foremost, to show the importance of complexity rather than computability in philosophical and AI problems. Second, to rephrase the notion of computability in terms of solvability, i.e. treating computability as non-sufficient for establishing intelligence. The Church-Turing thesis is therefore revisited and rephrased in order to capture the ontological background of spatial and temporal complexity. Third, to emphasize ontolog…
Conscious Intelligent Systems - Part II - Mind, Thought, Language and Understanding
这是一篇关于意识智能系统的论文的第二部分。我们使用在第一部分（意识智能系统第1部分：IXI（arxiv id cs.AI/0612056））中获得的理解来看待理解。我们看到心灵的存在如何影响理解和智能系统;我们看到心灵的存在需要语言。语言的兴起反过来又对理解产生了重要影响。我们讨论了类人的问题，以及自我意识的问题（以及心灵/思想/语言）如何影响类人。
Institute for Systems Biology（系统生物学研究所）；Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna（博洛尼亚大学）；European Centre for Living Technology（欧洲生命技术中心）
We approach the question "What is Consciousness?" in a new way, not as Descartes' "systematic doubt", but as how organisms find their way in their world. Finding one's way involves finding possible uses of features of the world that might be beneficial or avoiding those that might be harmful. "Possible uses of X to accomplish Y" are "Affordances". The number of uses of X is indefinite (or unknown), the different uses are unordered, are not listable, and are not deducible from one another. All biological adaptations are either affordances seized by heritable variation and selection or, far fast…
Can "consciousness" be observed from large language model (LLM) internal states? Dissecting LLM representations obtained from Theory of Mind test with Integrated Information Theory and Span Representation analysis
Automatic Minds: Cognitive Parallels Between Hypnotic States and Large Language Model Processing
IRCCS Istituto Auxologico Italiano（意大利辅助医学研究所）；Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore（圣心天主教大学）；Virtual Reality Medical Center（虚拟现实医学中心）；Virtual Reality Medical Institute（虚拟现实医学研究所）；University of Milano Bicocca（米兰比可卡大学）
MIMo: A Multi-Modal Infant Model for Studying Cognitive Development
Goethe-University Frankfurt（法兰克福歌德大学）；Max Planck Institute for Intelligent Systems（马克斯·普朗克智能系统研究所）；Hertie Institute for Clinical Brain Research（赫蒂临床脑研究所）；Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies（法兰克福高等研究院）
A multi-decade exploration into the theoretical foundations of artificial and natural general intelligence, which has been expressed in a series of books and papers and used to guide a series of practical and research-prototype software systems, is reviewed at a moderate level of detail. The review covers underlying philosophies (patternist philosophy of mind, foundational phenomenological and logical ontology), formalizations of the concept of intelligence, and a proposed high level architecture for AGI systems partly driven by these formalizations and philosophies. The implementation of spec…
The Causal Frame Problem: An Algorithmic Perspective
McGill University（麦吉尔大学）
框架问题（英语：Frame Problem，简称FP）是心理哲学和认识论中的一个难题，由《斯坦福哲学百科全书》（Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy）阐述如下：“我们如何解释我们表面上只根据与当前情况相关的东西而不必明确考虑所有不相关的东西来做出决定的能力？“在这项工作中，我们专注于FP的因果变体，因果框架问题（CFP）。假设推理机的心理因果模型可以（隐式）由因果贝叶斯网表示，我们首先引入一个概念，称为潜在水平（PL）。PL，本质上，编码一个节点相对于它的邻居在因果贝叶斯网络的相对位置。利用心理学文献的因果判断，我们证实了索赔PL可能承担如何在头脑中编码的时间。使用PL，我们提出了一个推理框架，称为PL为基础的推理框架（PLIF），它允许一个有限理性的方法CFP正式阐述在马尔的算法分析水平。我们表明，我们提出的框架，PLIF，是一致的因果判断文献中的广泛的调查结果，PL和PLIF作出了一些预测，其中一些已经支持现有的研究结果。
