发表机构
University of Bucharest（布加勒斯特大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
研究探讨大语言模型在对话中缺乏思维存在感的问题，提出可信度取决于维度完整性的假设，定义了时间、真相、熵和爱四个维度及相关行为立场，识别出行为层，还陈述了可证伪预测，为感知通用人工智能提供概念框架。
AI 中文摘要
大语言模型虽具备广泛能力，但在持续一对一对话中仍显平淡，缺乏思维存在感。我们假设核心缺失要素并非更多能力，而是维度完整性。我们提出人工对话者的可信度，即用户赋予其内心生活的程度（感知思维），取决于其是否表达了人类用作思维证据的一小部分第一人称立场，且这与任务智能可分离。我们命名了四个这样的维度——时间、真相、熵和爱，每个维度都定义为一种行为立场而非基准能力，各有人类对应物和具体模拟路径；时间维度已有作者报告的原型。我们识别出一个可观察的行为层——主动性（自发行动）和节奏（轮流的形式和时机），通过它这些立场在对话中得以体现，部分已作为生产配套应用中的已部署功能实现。我们陈述了六个可证伪的预测，后续预注册研究将进行测试，区分出现在可预注册的和仍有待操作化的猜想。这是一个概念框架，未报告人类受试者数据，其核心比较性主张是预测而非发现。我们始终保持明确界限——目标是可推断的内在性，而非内在性本身；这是感知工程，而非机器意识理论——并将由此产生的依恋和操纵风险视为关键而非附带问题。
英文摘要
Large language models are broadly capable, yet in sustained one-to-one conversation they still read as flat: competent, responsive, and somehow not quite the presence of a mind. We hypothesize that a central missing ingredient is not more capability but dimensional completeness. We propose that the believability of an artificial interlocutor -- the degree to which a user attributes an inner life to it, which we call perceived mind -- is governed by whether the agent expresses a small set of first-person stances that humans use as evidence of mind, and that this is separable from task intelligence. We name four such dimensions -- time, truth, entropy, and love -- each defined as a behavioral stance rather than a benchmark competency, each with a human analog and a concrete emulation path; the time dimension already has an author-reported prototype. We identify an observable behavior layer -- initiative (unprompted action) and cadence (the shape and timing of turns) -- through which the stances surface in conversation, both partially realized as deployed features in a production companion application. We state six falsifiable predictions that a later pre-registered study will test, separating those that are pre-registrable now from those that remain conjectures pending operationalization. This is a conceptual framework: it reports no human-subjects data, and its central comparative claims are predictions, not findings. Throughout we hold a firm boundary -- the object is inferrable interiority, not interiority; this is perception engineering, not a theory of machine consciousness -- and we treat the resulting attachment and manipulation risks as load-bearing rather than incidental.
Comments12 pages, 1 figure, 3 tables
