Security is one of the main challenges of the Internet of Things (IoT). IoT devices are mainly powered by low-cost microcontrollers (MCUs) that typically lack basic hardware security mechanisms to separate security-critical applications from less critical components. Recently, Arm has started to release Cortex-M MCUs enhanced with TrustZone technology (i.e., TrustZone-M), a system-wide security solution aiming at providing robust protection for IoT devices. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) relying on TrustZone hardware have been perceived as safe havens for securing mobile devices. However, for the past few years, considerable effort has gone into unveiling hundreds of vulnerabilities and proposing a collection of relevant defense techniques to address several issues. While new TEE solutions built on TrustZone-M start flourishing, the lessons gathered from the research community appear to be falling short, as these new systems are trapping into the same pitfalls of the past.
In this paper, we present uTango, the first multi-world TEE for modern IoT devices. uTango proposes a novel architecture aiming at tackling the major architectural deficiencies currently affecting TrustZone(-M)-assisted TEEs. In particular, we leverage the very same TrustZone hardware primitives used by dual-world implementations to create multiple and equally secure execution environments within the normal world. We demonstrate the benefits of uTango by conducting an extensive evaluation on a real TrustZone-M hardware platform, i.e., Arm Musca-B1. uTango will be open-sourced and freely available on GitHub in hopes of engaging academia and industry on securing the foreseeable trillion IoT devices.
Memory-Efficient and Secure DNN Inference on TrustZone-enabled Consumer IoT Devices
Haihe Lab of ITAI(海河信息技术与人工智能实验室);College of Computer Science, Nankai University(南开大学计算机学院);Beijing Jiaotong University(北京交通大学);New Jersey Institute of Technology(新泽西理工学院)
An Enclave-based TEE for SE-in-SoC in RISC-V Industry
SoC中的安全元件(SE)在工业中的采用越来越多。物联网设备中的许多应用程序都绑定到SE,因为它提供了强大的加密功能和物理保护。虽然SE-in-SoC为软件程序提供了强大的隔离,但它也给PCB板制造带来了更高的设计复杂性和成本。此外,SE-in-SoC可能仍然存在安全问题,例如恶意软件安装和用户冒充。在这项工作中,我们采用TEE,一种硬件支持的安全技术,用于保护SE in SoC和RISCV。特别是,我们构建了各种隔离应用程序和操纵SE的飞地,使用RISC-V提供的固有安全原语。使用硬件和软件协同设计,该解决方案确保了应用程序之间的可信执行和安全通信。通过强制SE由受信任的飞地控制并使RISC-V核心对侧信道攻击具有弹性,进一步保护了SE的安全性。
The Cost of OSCORE and EDHOC for Constrained Devices
许多现代物联网应用依赖于受限应用协议(CoAP),因为它在现有互联网基础设施中的效率和无缝集成性。CoAP用来实现这些特征的策略之一是使用代理。不幸的是,为了让代理运行,它需要终止客户端和服务器之间的(D)TLS通道。因此,无法实现交换数据的端到端机密性、完整性和真实性。为了克服这个问题,互联网工程任务组(IETF)最近提出了(D)TLS的替代方案。该替代方案由两个新颖的协议组成:1)用于约束REST式环境的对象安全性(OSCORE),其为有效载荷数据提供认证加密;以及2)临时Diffie-Hellman Over COSE(EDHOC),其提供OSCORE所需的对称会话密钥。在本文中,我们提出了四个固件库的设计,这些协议特别是针对受约束的微控制器和他们的详细评估。更准确地说,我们提出了uOSCORE和uEDHOC库的设计,为常规的微控制器和uOSCORE-TEE和uEDHOC-TEE库的微控制器与可信执行环境(TEE),如微控制器具有ARM TrustZone-M。我们针对后一类设备的固件设计考虑到攻击者可能利用常见的软件漏洞,例如,协议逻辑、操作系统或应用程序中的缓冲区溢出危及协议安全性。uOSCORE-TEE和uEDHOC-TEE实现了加密操作和密钥与固件的其余部分的分离,固件的其余部分可能易受攻击。我们提出了一个评估我们的实施方面的RAM/闪存的要求,执行速度和能源的广泛的…
Zero-Trust Foundation Models: A New Paradigm for Secure and Collaborative Artificial Intelligence for Internet of Things
School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, TU Berlin(柏林技术大学电气与计算机工程学院);Real-Time and Embedded Computing Systems Research Centre (CISTER)(实时与嵌入式计算系统研究中心);Data61, CSIRO(数据61,澳大利亚联邦科学与工业研究组织);School of Computer Science and Engineering, the University of New South Wales(新南威尔士大学计算机科学与工程学院);State Key Laboratory of Public Big Data, College of Big Data and Information Engineering, Guizhou University(公共大数据国家重点实验室,贵州大学大数据与信息工程学院);Department of Computer Engineering, Qassim University(科威特大学计算机工程系);College of Computing and Data Science, Nanyang Technological University(南洋理工大学计算与数据科学学院);Division of Electrical Engineering, Department of Engineering, University of Cambridge(剑桥大学工程系电子工程系);Center for NeXt-Generation Communications (CXC), Koç University(下一代通信中心(CXC),科隆大学)