平均主义判断聚合
Egalitarian Judgment Aggregation
摘要：
平等主义的考虑在社会选择理论的许多领域都起着核心作用。平等主义原则的应用范围从确保每个人在决定如何分割蛋糕时都能得到平等的份额，到保证委员会选举中性别或种族的平衡。然而，平均主义的方法在判断聚合中很少受到关注-一个强大的框架，用于聚合逻辑上相互关联的问题。我们迈出了填补这一空白的第一步。我们引入公理捕获两个经典的解释，平均主义的判断聚合，并在现有的公理的背景下，在相关的框架下，信仰合并。然后，我们探讨了这些公理和几个概念之间的关系，从社会选择理论的防策略。最后，一个新的平等主义的判断聚合规则源于我们的分析，我们提出了复杂的结果，结果确定和战略操纵的规则。
英文摘要：
Egalitarian considerations play a central role in many areas of social choice theory. Applications of egalitarian principles range from ensuring everyone gets an equal share of a cake when deciding how to divide it, to guaranteeing balance with respect to gender or ethnicity in committee elections. Yet, the egalitarian approach has received little attention in judgment aggregation -- a powerful framework for aggregating logically interconnected issues. We make the first steps towards filling that gap. We introduce axioms capturing two classical interpretations of egalitarianism in judgment aggregation and situate these within the context of existing axioms in the pertinent framework of belief merging. We then explore the relationship between these axioms and several notions of strategyproofness from social choice theory at large. Finally, a novel egalitarian judgment aggregation rule stems from our analysis; we present complexity results concerning both outcome determination and strategic manipulation for that rule.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
