Pearl opened the door to formally defining actual causation using causal models. His approach rests on two strategies: first, capturing the widespread intuition that X=x causes Y=y iff X=x is a Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set for Y=y, and second, showing that his definition gives intuitive answers on a wide set of problem cases. This inspired dozens of variations of his definition of actual causation, the most prominent of which are due to Halpern & Pearl. Yet all of them ignore Pearl's first strategy, and the second strategy taken by itself is unable to deliver a consensus. This paper offers a way out by going back to the first strategy: it offers six formal definitions of causal sufficiency and two interpretations of necessity. Combining the two gives twelve new definitions of actual causation. Several interesting results about these definitions and their relation to the various Halpern & Pearl definitions are presented. Afterwards the second strategy is evaluated as well. In order to maximize neutrality, the paper relies mostly on the examples and intuitions of Halpern & Pearl. One definition comes out as being superior to all others, and is therefore suggested as a new definition of actual causation.
Causal Sufficiency and Necessity Improves Chain-of-Thought Reasoning
Tianjin University(天津大学);City University of Hong Kong(香港城市大学);University College London(伦敦大学学院);Peking University(北京大学);The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou)(香港科学与技术大学(广州));University of Bristol(布里斯托大学)
A Computationally Feasible Framework for Causal Probabilistic Explanation
Basis Research Institute(贝西斯研究所);Sorbus AI(索巴斯人工智能公司);Massachusetts Institute of Technology(麻省理工学院);University of Massachusetts Amherst(马萨诸塞大学阿默斯特分校);University of California, Los Angeles(加利福尼亚大学洛杉矶分校);HouseIQ(豪斯IQ公司)