因果关系的反事实NESS定义
The Counterfactual NESS Definition of Causation
摘要:
在之前与Joost Vennekens的合作中,我提出了一个基于某些合理原则的实际因果关系的定义,从而使关于因果关系的辩论从对实例的严重关注转向更系统的分析。本文从两个方面对这一分析作出了贡献。首先,我表明,我们的定义实际上是一个形式化的赖特著名的NESS定义的因果关系相结合的反事实的差异制造条件。这意味着,我们的定义整合了两种非常有影响力的因果关系方法,这两种方法声称彼此对立。第二,我修改了我们的定义,以提供一个实质性的改进:我削弱了差异制造条件,以这样一种方式,它避免了有问题的分析情况下的优先购买权。由此产生的反事实NESS因果关系定义形成了反事实方法和NESS方法之间的自然妥协。
英文摘要:
In previous work with Joost Vennekens I proposed a definition of actual causation that is based on certain plausible principles, thereby allowing the debate on causation to shift away from its heavy focus on examples towards a more systematic analysis. This paper contributes to that analysis in two ways. First, I show that our definition is in fact a formalization of Wright's famous NESS definition of causation combined with a counterfactual difference-making condition. This means that our definition integrates two highly influential approaches to causation that are claimed to stand in opposition to each other. Second, I modify our definition to offer a substantial improvement: I weaken the difference-making condition in such a way that it avoids the problematic analysis of cases of preemption. The resulting Counterfactual NESS definition of causation forms a natural compromise between counterfactual approaches and the NESS approach.
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