趋同投票：从两两比较到共识
Convergence Voting: From Pairwise Comparisons to Consensus
摘要：
人工智能设计和伦理的一个重要方面是创建反映社会总体偏好的系统。为此，经常使用社会选择理论的技术。我们提出了一个新的社会选择功能的PageRank算法的动机。该函数基于成对比较的孔多塞图对投票选项进行排名。为此，我们将孔多塞图转化为马尔可夫链，其平稳分布提供了选项的分数。我们展示了固定分布中的值如何被解释为投票选项的量化总支持，选民社区通过一系列虚构的谈判步骤收敛到该选项。因此，我们建议将新的投票方案命名为“收敛投票”，并将由此产生的固定分数分配命名为“协商社区支持”。我们的社会选择函数可以被看作是一种共识投票方法，介于科普兰和博尔达之间。一方面，它并不一定选择孔多塞冠军，因为强大的支持，从社会的一部分，可以超过平庸的统一支持。另一方面，不受欢迎的候选人对结果的影响小于共识投票的主要技术，即，博达伯爵我们实现了这一点，而不必像其他一些方法那样引入一个特别的权重。
英文摘要：
An important aspect of AI design and ethics is to create systems that reflect aggregate preferences of the society. To this end, the techniques of social choice theory are often utilized. We propose a new social choice function motivated by the PageRank algorithm. The function ranks voting options based on the Condorcet graph of pairwise comparisons. To this end, we transform the Condorcet graph into a Markov chain whose stationary distribution provides the scores of the options. We show how the values in the stationary distribution can be interpreted as quantified aggregate support for the voting options, to which the community of voters converges through an imaginary sequence of negotiating steps. Because of that, we suggest the name "convergence voting" for the new voting scheme, and "negotiated community support" for the resulting stationary allocation of scores. Our social choice function can be viewed as a consensus voting method, sitting somewhere between Copeland and Borda. On the one hand, it does not necessarily choose the Condorcet winner, as strong support from a part of the society can outweigh mediocre uniform support. On the other hand, the influence of unpopular candidates on the outcome is smaller than in the primary technique of consensus voting, i.e., the Borda count. We achieve that without having to introduce an ad hoc weighting that some other methods do.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
