内生网络博弈
Games on Endogenous Networks
AI总结：
本研究提出内生网络博弈框架，结合纳什均衡与成对稳定性，揭示稳定网络在特定条件下呈有序重叠团或嵌套分裂图结构，并应用于地位竞争、匹配模型及群体设计后果分析。
摘要：
我们研究网络博弈，其中参与者既选择与之交往的伙伴，又选择为这些伙伴产生溢出效应的行动水平（如努力）。我们引入一个框架和两个解概念，扩展了分别分析每种选择的孤立标准方法：行动中的纳什均衡和链接中的成对稳定性。我们的主要结果表明，在激励的适当顺序条件下，稳定网络呈现简单形式。第一个条件涉及链接是否产生正或负的收益溢出。第二个条件涉及行动是链接的战略互补还是战略替代。这些条件共同产生了一个围绕两种网络架构组织的网络结构与经济基础之间关系的分类：有序重叠团和嵌套分裂图。我们应用我们的模型来理解地位竞争的后果，为假设团形成的匹配模型提供微观基础，并解释强调群体设计意外后果的实证发现。
英文摘要：
We study network games in which players choose both the partners with whom they associate and an action level (e.g., effort) that creates spillovers for those partners. We introduce a framework and two solution concepts, extending standard approaches for analyzing each choice in isolation: Nash equilibrium in actions and pairwise stability in links. Our main results show that, under suitable order conditions on incentives, stable networks take simple forms. The first condition concerns whether links create positive or negative payoff spillovers. The second concerns whether actions are strategic complements to links, or strategic substitutes. Together, these conditions yield a taxonomy of the relationship between network structure and economic primitives organized around two network architectures: ordered overlapping cliques and nested split graphs. We apply our model to understand the consequences of competition for status, to microfound matching models that assume clique formation, and to interpret empirical findings that highlight unintended consequences of group design.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
