道德和关注行为主体的博弈模型
Game-theoretic Models of Moral and Other-Regarding Agents
摘要：
我们研究有限范式博弈中的康德均衡，这是最近在经济学文献中提出的一类非纳什的、道德动机的行为过程。我们强调了一些问题，这样的平衡，包括计算的棘手性，高价格的失调，和昂贵的/有问题的扩展一般范式游戏。我们指出，这样一个适当的推广将可能涉及的概念，计划平衡。最后，我们提出了一些一般的，直观的，易于计算的，其他有关康德的均衡，以及一类行动的课程，纯粹的自我考虑和康德的行为之间的插值。
英文摘要：
We investigate Kantian equilibria in finite normal form games, a class of non-Nashian, morally motivated courses of action that was recently proposed in the economics literature. We highlight a number of problems with such equilibria, including computational intractability, a high price of miscoordination, and expensive/problematic extension to general normal form games. We point out that such a proper generalization will likely involve the concept of program equilibrium. Finally we propose some general, intuitive, computationally tractable, other-regarding equilibria related to Kantian equilibria, as well as a class of courses of action that interpolates between purely self-regarding and Kantian behavior.
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