最后通牒博弈中的社会偏好与道德偏好：一个理论模型与实验
Social versus Moral preferences in the Ultimatum Game: A theoretical model and an experiment
摘要：
在最后通牒博弈（UG）中，一个名为“提议者”的参与者必须决定如何在自己和“回应者”之间分配一定数量的钱。如果报价大于或等于响应者的最低可接受报价（MAO），则按提议分割资金，否则，提议者和响应者都得不到任何东西。普遍语法引起了几代行为科学家的兴趣，因为实验中的人们公然违反了均衡预测，即自利的提议者提供了最小可用的非零量，而自利的回应者接受了。为什么这些预测被违背了？以前的研究主要集中在社会偏好的作用。人们对做正确的事情的一般道德偏好的作用知之甚少，这些偏好在其他社会互动中起着重要作用（例如，独裁者博弈与囚徒困境（Prisoner's Dilemma）在这里，我开发了一个理论模型和一个实验，旨在坑社会偏好对道德偏好。我发现，虽然人们认识到，提供一半，拒绝低报价是道德上正确的事情，道德偏好没有因果关系的影响，UG行为。实验数据确实很好地拟合的模型，根据该模型：（i）高UG提供的动机不公平厌恶，在较小程度上，自我利益;（ii）高MAOs的动机不公平厌恶。
英文摘要：
In the Ultimatum Game (UG) one player, named "proposer", has to decide how to allocate a certain amount of money between herself and a "responder". If the offer is greater than or equal to the responder's minimum acceptable offer (MAO), then the money is split as proposed, otherwise, neither the proposer nor the responder get anything. The UG has intrigued generations of behavioral scientists because people in experiments blatantly violate the equilibrium predictions that self-interested proposers offer the minimum available non-zero amount, and self-interested responders accept. Why are these predictions violated? Previous research has mainly focused on the role of social preferences. Little is known about the role of general moral preferences for doing the right thing, preferences that have been shown to play a major role in other social interactions (e.g., Dictator Game and Prisoner's Dilemma). Here I develop a theoretical model and an experiment designed to pit social preferences against moral preferences. I find that, although people recognize that offering half and rejecting low offers are the morally right things to do, moral preferences have no causal impact on UG behavior. The experimental data are indeed well fit by a model according to which: (i) high UG offers are motivated by inequity aversion and, to a lesser extent, self-interest; (ii) high MAOs are motivated by inequity aversion.
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