启动直觉不赞成工具性伤害，但不赞成公正的善行
Priming intuition disfavors instrumental harm but not impartial beneficence
摘要：
理解道德判断的认知基础是心理科学中最紧迫的问题之一。一些被大量引用的研究表明，在牺牲性道德困境中，依赖直觉会减少功利主义（预期福利最大化）的判断，在这种困境中，人们必须决定是否工具性地伤害（IH）一个人来拯救更多的人。然而，最近的工作表明，这种困境是有限的，因为他们没有捕捉到积极的，功利主义的核心定义：致力于公正的善行（IB）。因此，一个新的二维模型的功利判断已经提出了区分IH和IB组件。直觉在这个新模型中的作用还没有被研究过。依赖直觉是否只在工具性伤害的维度上不利于功利主义的选择，还是在公正的善行的维度上也不利于功利主义的选择？为了回答这个问题，我们进行了三项研究（总N = 970，两个预注册）使用概念启动的直觉与审议的道德判断。我们的证据收敛在一个相互作用的影响，直觉减少功利判断IH -如以前的工作所建议的-但未能做到这一点在IB。这些发现支持了最近提出的功利主义道德判断的二维模型，并为未来的研究指出了新的途径。
英文摘要：
Understanding the cognitive underpinnings of moral judgment is one of most pressing problems in psychological science. Some highly-cited studies suggest that reliance on intuition decreases utilitarian (expected welfare maximizing) judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas in which one has to decide whether to instrumentally harm (IH) one person to save a greater number of people. However, recent work suggests that such dilemmas are limited in that they fail to capture the positive, defining core of utilitarianism: commitment to impartial beneficence (IB). Accordingly, a new two-dimensional model of utilitarian judgment has been proposed that distinguishes IH and IB components. The role of intuition on this new model has not been studied. Does relying on intuition disfavor utilitarian choices only along the dimension of instrumental harm or does it also do so along the dimension of impartial beneficence? To answer this question, we conducted three studies (total N = 970, two preregistered) using conceptual priming of intuition versus deliberation on moral judgments. Our evidence converges on an interaction effect, with intuition decreasing utilitarian judgments in IH - as suggested by previous work - but failing to do so in IB. These findings bolster the recently proposed two-dimensional model of utilitarian moral judgment, and point to new avenues for future research.
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