引导非合作主体的聚集行为：一个轻推框架
Steering the aggregative behavior of noncooperative agents: a nudge framework
摘要：
本文研究了非合作价格接受主体群体的聚集行为如何转向期望行为的问题。不同于传统的定价方案的价格是完全可用的设计，我们考虑的情况下，一个系统监管机构广播的价格预测信号，可以是不同的代理人所产生的实际价格。由此产生的可靠性问题，考虑到我们的模型中包括信任动态，这意味着代理人不会盲目地遵循监管机构发出的信号，而是根据其准确性的历史，即其偏离实际价格。我们提出了几个轻推机制，以产生合适的价格预测信号，能够引导代理的聚集行为，以固定以及时间所需的聚集行为。我们提供的多组分模型的分析收敛保证。特别是，我们证明了建议的轻推机制赚取和保持充分的信任的代理，和聚合行为收敛到所需的。分析结果的补充插电式电动汽车的协调充电的数值案例研究。
英文摘要：
This paper considers the problem of steering the aggregative behavior of a population of noncooperative price-taking agents towards a desired behavior. Different from conventional pricing schemes where the price is fully available for design, we consider the scenario where a system regulator broadcasts a price prediction signal that can be different from the actual price incurred by the agents. The resulting reliability issues are taken into account by including trust dynamics in our model, implying that the agents will not blindly follow the signal sent by the regulator, but rather follow it based on the history of its accuracy, i.e, its deviation from the actual price. We present several nudge mechanisms to generate suitable price prediction signals that are able to steer the aggregative behavior of the agents to stationary as well as temporal desired aggregative behaviors. We provide analytical convergence guarantees for the resulting multi-components models. In particular, we prove that the proposed nudge mechanisms earn and maintain full trust of the agents, and the aggregative behavior converges to the desired one. The analytical results are complemented by a numerical case study of coordinated charging of plug-in electric vehicles.
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