HTLC与交叉链原子交换的博弈分析
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cross-Chain Atomic Swaps with HTLCs
摘要：
为了实现未连接账本之间的互操作性，哈希时间锁合约（HTLC）通常用于跨链资产交换。该解决方案容忍交易失败，并且可以通过允许交易代理在中止的情况下至少保留其原始资产来“从最坏的情况中汲取最好的”。尽管如此，作为一个不希望的结果，重复发生的事务失败促使对协议进行批判性和分析性的检查。在这项研究中，我们提出了一个博弈论的框架来研究的战略行为的代理参与跨链原子交换实现HTLC。我们研究了交易的成功率作为互换汇率，代币价格及其波动性等变量的函数。我们证明，在试图最大限度地提高自己的效用，资产价格的变化，任何代理人可能会退出互换。我们的模型的扩展证实，抵押存款可以提高交易成功率，激励进一步研究抵押没有可信的第三方。第二个模型的变化表明，当代理人动态调整汇率，以应对价格波动时，互换更有可能成功。
英文摘要：
To achieve interoperability between unconnected ledgers, hash time lock contracts (HTLCs) are commonly used for cross-chain asset exchange. The solution tolerates transaction failure, and can "make the best out of worst'' by allowing transacting agents to at least keep their original assets in case of an abort. Nonetheless, as an undesired outcome, reoccurring transaction failures prompt a critical and analytical examination of the protocol. In this study, we propose a game-theoretic framework to study the strategic behaviors of agents taking part in cross-chain atomic swaps implemented with HTLCs. We study the success rate of the transaction as a function of the exchange rate of the swap, the token price and its volatility, among other variables. We demonstrate that in an attempt to maximize one's own utility as asset price changes, either agent might withdraw from the swap. An extension of our model confirms that collateral deposits can improve the transaction success rate, motivating further research towards collateralization without a trusted third party. A second model variation suggests that a swap is more likely to succeed when agents dynamically adjust the exchange rate in response to price fluctuations.
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