基于分组化支付的交叉账户互换的博弈分析
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cross-Ledger Swaps with Packetized Payments
摘要：
我们提出了一个博弈论框架来研究分组支付的结果，这是一种跨账本交易协议，具有战略性和可能的恶意代理。我们推导出交易失败率，并证明，没有纪律机制，打包支付可能是不完整的。我们的分析表明，抵押存款可以防止恶意代理人利用该协议。我们进一步推断，存款金额应取决于标的资产的价格波动，或者它应该随着价格的变化而动态调整。
英文摘要：
We propose a game-theoretic framework to study the outcomes of packetized payments, a cross-ledger transaction protocol, with strategic and possibly malicious agents. We derive the transaction failure rate and demonstrate that without disciplinary mechanisms, packetized payments are likely to be incomplete. Our analysis suggests that collateral deposits can prevent malicious agents from taking advantage of the protocol. We further infer that the deposit amount should depend on the underlying asset price volatility or that it should be dynamically adjusted as the price changes.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
