反协调博弈中冒险行为与地位偏好的演化
Evolution of Risk-Taking Behaviour and Status Preferences in Anti-Coordination Games
摘要：
本文分析了当个体面临反协调任务时，风险承担行为和消费偏好如何表现为一个中立稳定均衡。如果在一个其他方面都是同质的社会中，关于相对消费的信息变得可用，那么这一点就不能被忽视。尽管在目标函数中存在差异，但稳定类型必须愿意接受冒险的赌博来区分自己，从而允许协调。相对消费是一种昂贵的交流方式。这表明，在不协调代价特别高的环境中，地位偏好是突出的。
英文摘要：
This paper analyses how risk-taking behaviour and preferences over consumption rank can emerge as a neutrally stable equilibrium when individuals face an anti-coordination task. If in an otherwise homogeneous society information about relative consumption becomes available, this cannot be ignored. Despite concavity in the objective function, stable types must be willing to accept risky gambles to differentiate themselves, and thus allow for coordination. Relative consumption acts as a form of costly communication. This suggests status preferences to be salient in settings where miscoordination is particularly costly.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
