Should firms that apply machine learning algorithms in their decision-making make their algorithms transparent to the users they affect? Despite growing calls for algorithmic transparency, most firms have kept their algorithms opaque, citing potential gaming by users that may negatively affect the algorithm's predictive power. We develop an analytical model to compare firm and user surplus with and without algorithmic transparency in the presence of strategic users and present novel insights. We identify a broad set of conditions under which making the algorithm transparent benefits the firm. We show that, in some cases, even the predictive power of machine learning algorithms may increase if the firm makes them transparent. By contrast, users may not always be better off under algorithmic transparency. The results hold even when the predictive power of the opaque algorithm comes largely from correlational features and the cost for users to improve on them is close to zero. Overall, our results show that firms should not view manipulation by users as bad. Rather, they should use algorithmic transparency as a lever to motivate users to invest in more desirable features.
Stern School of Business, New York University(纽约大学斯特恩商学院);Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania(宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院);Graduate Group in Applied Mathematics and Computational Science, University of Pennsylvania(宾夕法尼亚大学应用数学与计算科学研究生小组)
Informatics Institute, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands(阿姆斯特丹大学信息学院);ING Research Project Lead(ING研究项目负责人);ING Analytics, ING Group, Amsterdam, The Netherlands(ING分析部、ING集团、荷兰阿姆斯特丹);Delft Institute of Applied Mathematics (DIAM), TU Delft, The Netherlands(代尔夫特应用数学研究所(DIAM)、代尔夫特理工大学、荷兰)
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich(苏黎世联邦理工学院);Krakow University of Economics(克拉科夫经济大学);California Institute of Technology(加州理工学院);University of Zurich(苏黎世大学)
Technion Israel Institute of Technology(以色列理工学院);Indian Institute of Technology Hyderabad(印度理工学院海得拉巴分校);Google Research(谷歌研究院)
人类已经开始依赖机器将过多的信息减少到可管理的表示。但这种依赖可能会被滥用--战略机器可能会精心制作操纵用户的表示。用户如何根据策略表示做出好的选择?我们将其形式化为一个学习问题,并追求对操纵具有鲁棒性的决策算法。在我们感兴趣的主要设置中,系统向用户表示物品的属性,然后用户决定是否消费。我们通过战略分类的镜头(Hardt et al. 2016)对这种交互进行建模,颠倒过来:学习的用户首先进行游戏;响应的系统其次进行游戏。系统必须以揭示“除了真相之外别无他物”的表述作出回应,但不需要揭示全部真相。因此,用户面临的问题,学习下的战略子集选择,这提出了不同的算法和统计的挑战集函数。我们的主要结果是一个学习算法,最大限度地减少错误,尽管战略表示,我们的理论分析揭示了学习努力和敏感性之间的权衡操纵。