Social choice is the theory about collective decision towards social welfare starting from individual opinions, preferences, interests or welfare. The field of Computational Social Welfare is somewhat recent and it is gaining impact in the Artificial Intelligence Community. Classical literature makes the assumption of single-peaked preferences, i.e. there exist a order in the preferences and there is a global maximum in this order. This year some theoretical results were published about Two-stage Approval Voting Systems (TAVs), Multi-winner Selection Rules (MWSR) and Incomplete (IPs) and Circular Preferences (CPs). The purpose of this paper is three-fold: Firstly, I want to introduced Social Choice Optimisation as a generalisation of TAVs where there is a max stage and a min stage implementing thus a Minimax, well-known Artificial Intelligence decision-making rule to minimize hindering towards a (Social) Goal. Secondly, I want to introduce, following my Open Standardization and Open Integration Theory (in refinement process) put in practice in my dissertation, the Open Standardization of Social Inclusion, as a global social goal of Social Choice Optimization.
Social welfare optimisation in well-mixed and structured populations
Faculty of Computer Science and Engineering, Ho Chi Minh City University of Technology (HCMUT), Vietnam(计算机科学与工程学院,胡志明市技术大学(HCMUT));Vietnam National University - Ho Chi Minh City (VNU-HCM), Vietnam(越南国家大学-胡志明市(VNU-HCM))
Social welfare optimisation under institutional reward and punishment
Faculty of Computer Science and Engineering, Ho Chi Minh City University of Technology (HCMUT), Vietnam(胡志明市技术大学计算机科学与工程学院,越南);Vietnam National University - Ho Chi Minh City (VNU-HCM), Vietnam(越南胡志明市国家大学(VNU-HCM),越南);School of Computing, Engineering and Digital Technologies, Teesside University, United Kingdom(泰赛德大学计算、工程与数字技术学院,英国);School of Mathematics, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom(伯明翰大学数学学院,英国)
Welfare as a Guiding Principle for Machine Learning -- From Compass, to Lens, to Roadmap
Faculty of Computer Science(计算机科学学院);Technion – Israel Institute of Technology(技术ion–以色列理工学院);Department of Computer Science(计算机科学系);University of Chicago(芝加哥大学)
Evolutionary mechanisms that promote cooperation may not promote social welfare
Teesside University(提赛德大学);University of Birmingham(伯明翰大学);University of Maribor(马里博尔大学);Community Healthcare Center Dr. Adolf Drolc Maribor(阿道夫·德罗尔奇博士马里博尔社区医疗中心);Complexity Science Hub Vienna(维也纳复杂科学中心);Kyung Hee University(庆熙大学)