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arXiv 2007.13305cs.CYcs.CEcs.GT
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控制COVID-19爆发的非合作博弈分析

Controlling the Outbreak of COVID-19: A Noncooperative Game Perspective

Anupam Kumar Bairagi, Mehedi Masud, Do Hyeon Kim, Md. Shirajum Munir, Abdullah Al Nahid, Sarder Fakhrul Abedin, Kazi Masudul Alam, Sujit Biswas, Sultan S Alsham… 展开作者

Anupam Kumar Bairagi, Mehedi Masud, Do Hyeon Kim, Md. Shirajum Munir, Abdullah Al Nahid, Sarder Fakhrul Abedin, Kazi Masudul Alam, Sujit Biswas, Sultan S Alshamrani, Zhu Han, Choong Seon Hong

摘要:

COVID-19是一种全球流行病。到目前为止,这种流行病没有补救办法。然而,隔离及保持社交距离似乎是控制此流行病的有效预防措施。因此,在本文中,制定了一个优化问题,同时容纳隔离和社会距离的个人功能。为了促进社交距离,我们通过应用非合作博弈来解决公式化问题,该博弈可以为保持社交距离提供激励,以防止COVID-19的传播。此外,封锁政策的可持续性解释与我们提出的博弈论激励模型的帮助下,保持社会距离存在一个纳什均衡。最后,我们进行了广泛的数值分析,显示了所提出的方法在实现所需的社交距离以防止COVID-19在非合作环境中爆发方面的有效性。数值结果表明,在所有考虑的情况下,随着家庭隔离比例从25%增加到100%,个人激励增加了85%以上。数值结果还表明,在一定比例的家庭隔离,个人的激励随着个人数量的增加而减少。

英文摘要:

COVID-19 is a global epidemic. Till now, there is no remedy for this epidemic. However, isolation and social distancing are seemed to be effective preventive measures to control this pandemic. Therefore, in this paper, an optimization problem is formulated that accommodates both isolation and social distancing features of the individuals. To promote social distancing, we solve the formulated problem by applying a noncooperative game that can provide an incentive for maintaining social distancing to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Furthermore, the sustainability of the lockdown policy is interpreted with the help of our proposed game-theoretic incentive model for maintaining social distancing where there exists a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we perform an extensive numerical analysis that shows the effectiveness of the proposed approach in terms of achieving the desired social-distancing to prevent the outbreak of the COVID-19 in a noncooperative environment. Numerical results show that the individual incentive increases more than 85% with an increasing percentage of home isolation from 25% to 100% for all considered scenarios. The numerical results also demonstrate that in a particular percentage of home isolation, the individual incentive decreases with an increasing number of individuals.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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